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Chapter 1. Introduction  
The political transformations that took place in Latin America from the mid-1970s 
onwards, were described by Samuel P. Huntington as the ‘third wave of democratization’. 
The global shift towards democracy, specifically a “group of transitions from 
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur[ed] within a specific period of time” 
became known as the waves of democratization (Huntington, 1991, p.15). As a result of 
this democratization trend and process, scholars and observers became increasingly 
optimistic about the consolidation of institutions and democracy in Latin America.  
The party system, characterized by a minimum of two political parties interacting 
in structured forms (Melendez, 2012, p.5), is considered to be one of the most important 
institutions of democracy, followed by strong and representative political parties. 
According to Alexis de Tocqueville (1962) this is because political associations and parties 
are the key institutions of civil society. Thus, party system consolidation came to represent 
a significant indicator of a democratic form of governance. The political party however, 
regarded as one of the central pillars of democracy, has been met with increasing public 
dissatisfaction in Latin America (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003, p.1).  
During the 1970s, when global attention focused on the consolidation of  
democracy in the southern region of the American continent, Latin American politics 
experienced the unprecedented. On the one hand, countries such as Colombia and 
Venezuela, that possessed a long tradition of strong and institutionalized party systems, 
aspired to further consolidate democracy. On the other hand, the Peruvian, Ecuadorian 
and Bolivian party systems regarded as inchoate and possessing extreme low levels of 
institutionalization, aspired to institutionalize the party system as a result of the 
democratization trend. Overall however, these five countries countries experienced a 
trend of severe party system decay during the late 1980s and 1990s that gave rise to the 
collapse of the party systems across the region.  
Literature centering on democratic governance in Latin America is abundant and 
for many decades Latin America has become the focus of a number of studies that look at 
its forms of governability, which either challenge or try to follow the democratic standards 
prominent in Northern Europe and North America. In the last decades, party system 
fragmentation has been an ongoing phenomenon specifically challenging governability in 
the Andean Region. Similarly, a crisis in democratic representation remains a critical 
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factor that shapes the political system in the region today (Mainwaring et al, 2006, p.13). 
Party system fragmentation, concerned with the breakdown of one of the central political 
institutions or democratic representation, embodying the political relationship between 
the citizen and the representative, are not new phenomena in the discipline  of political 
science.  Despite this, analyzing these phenomena within, as well as across the diverse, 
complex and unique political environments in Latin America is particularly important. 
Firstly, however, these phenomena need to be more specifically defined.   
 Party system fragmentation occurs when the party system decomposes and the 
levels of competition and rootedness are weak. The concept of party system 
institutionalization that measures different dimensions of the party system, are useful to 
determine fragmentation. Low levels of institutionalization reveal high electoral volatility, 
low political party legitimacy, lack of political identification and political party 
organizational deficit. Fragmentation thus, considering the indicators mentioned, 
represents the decomposition of the party system.  
In turn, as examined by Scott Mainwaring (2006), the patterns that presuppose 
changes in representation are foremost affected by instability. The quality of democratic 
representation is troubled when the electorate, the citizens, feel omitted from the political 
process, a lack of popular democracy is present, and the formal mechanisms of 
representation are no longer adequate (2006, p.19). Particularly in Peru, both phenomena 
are salient and a crisis of democratic representation that challenges the country’s political 
system has been prominent (Mainwaring, 2006 and Tanaka, 1998, 2003). A crisis of 
democratic representation reveals that the “… traditionally strong political parties have 
eroded or disappeared throughout Latin America allowing for the rise of political 
outsiders and a surge of political mobilization against the political establishment” 
(Mainwaring, 2006, p.13). Considering the variety of elements and interconnected 
indicators that both phenomena involve, it is rather evident they are not unrelated since 
party system fragmentation can influence on the quality of democratic representation  
greatly.  
Certainly, the interest of the current study lies in further exploring and examining 
the relationship between party system change, specifically fragmentation, and democratic 
representation, regarding its quality. This research thus, will focus primarily on analyzing 
this relationship by paying particular attention to key indicators that establish, on the one 
hand, party system fragmentation and, on the other, that represent the quality of 
democratic representation. Specifically, the inquiry to be answered in this research is 
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framed as follows: how does party system fragmentation influence the quality of 
democratic representation? Furthermore, this study aims to examine if party system 
fragmentation contributes to a crisis of democratic representation.  
An ongoing party system fragmentation,  the rise of political outsiders and anti-
establishment figures together with the increasing dissatisfaction and rejection towards 
institutions, have shaped different forms of citizen-representative linkages in the Andean 
Region. Trust in institutions, an important factor that has an effect on democratic stability 
and that further reflects the electorate’s behavior (Tanaka and Vera, 2010, p.104), has 
been remarkably low in the last decades. In Peru, all these conditions are salient and shape 
a complex political reality. In fact, according to the Latinobarometro 1 figures of 2008, a 
public opinion poll in Latin America, which measures different conditions and elements 
that shape democratic stability, Peru ranks lowest in the levels of trust towards two core 
institutions, the congress and the political parties.  
The prevailing argument shaping this research thus, maintains that party system 
fragmentation and the quality of democratic representation are interconnected 
phenomena influencing each other. Moreover, due to the fact that the so-called 
programmatic linkages between voters and agents are weakened, these allow for the rise 
of other forms of citizen-representative linkages, for example those characterized by 
personalist and clientelist traits. As it will be shown, both phenomena are characteristic  
elements of an unstable political system, which challenges and hinders democratic 
consolidation.  
It is ultimately maintained that if not assessed together, the understanding of the 
weakened institutional landscape that occurs in Latin America and in Peru in particular, 
would be remarkably limited. These two phenomena have to be considered jointly to 
allow for a comprehensive understanding of the political scenario and the key aspects of 
the puzzling political system prevailing in Peru and the region. Peru is the focus of this 
study due to the fact that the Peruvian party system decomposed abruptly in the late 
1980s onwards and all conditions regarding the quality of democratic representation 
mentioned previously have been particularly salient in the country. The relationship 
between these phenomena thus, seems to be present in Peru, making the country a 
valuable case to examine.  
                                                 
1 Latinobarómetro is “an annual public opinion survey that involves some 20,000 interviews in 18 
Latin American countries, representing more than 600 million inhabitants”. See: 
www.latinobarometro.org for more information.   
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This study firstly delivers a literature review on the most relevant academic work 
concerning the party system fragmentation and democratic representation. This allows for 
the formulation of a framework that establishes the theoretical and conceptual direction 
taken.  In order to empirically study these subjects, key indicators and conditions are 
established. Concerning party system fragmentation, the indicators of the levels of 
institutionalization are inter-party competition, party rootedness in society and party 
organization. In turn, regarding democratic representation, the conditions selected to best 
establish its quality, are the levels of trust towards the party system, clientelist linkages 
and the emergence of outsiders. These indicators and conditions will be examined from 
1980 up to 2011 in the Peruvian context hoping to deliver results that are in line with the 
arguments previously mentioned.  
This study aims to contribute to the academic discussion on the relationship 
between the party system and democratic representation. It will be determined if  in the 
Peruvian case, whether the study of party system change, expressed specifically in 
fragmentation, greatly influences the quality of democratic representation. If party system 
stability is crucial for the quality of democratic representation and by extension, for 
democratic stability, the role of the party system and the political parties that comprise it 
needs to be emphasized. Due to the fact that weak political parties  “… shape the political 
system in a variety of ways” (Mainwaring, 1995, p. 3), this research aims to establish that 
one way is directly affecting the quality of democratic representation.  
Research focusing on these subjects does not only hold value for theory building, 
as it provides a framework for analysis in an adverse political system such as the Peruvian 
one, but also possesses pertinent arguments of high societal relevance. Much of the 
literature claims that political parties and democratic representation play an important 
role in democratic stability. If the results of this study show that these phenomena are 
actually more interconnected than it has been thus far considered, such findings could 
have significant implications for the study of these concepts, the functions they perform 
and their relationship within democratic systems post 1970s.  
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
The interest of the current study is firmly rooted in the relationship between party system 
fragmentation and democratic representation, and specifically, how the former may 
influence the latter’s quality. It is thus important to review the literature concerned with 
the fundamental concepts that frame this study in its wider context as well as set the 
premise for subsequent analysis. Accordingly, this chapter will look firstly at the relevant 
studies concerning party systems in wide-ranging terms and their functionality in a 
democracy.  
Moreover, party system fragmentation and the consequences thereof within the 
Latin American context will be assessed. Subsequently, democratic representation 
literature will be explored and evaluated focusing specifically on political representation 
and the mechanisms that presuppose it. This will be followed by the theory that frames 
party system fragmentation and the quality of democratic representation, which will allow 
the establishment of the conceptual ground of the so-called crisis of representation as it 
transpires in the Andean Region of Latin America.  
 
Political Parties and Democracy  
Political parties are widely perceived to be a fundamental element of modern democracy. 
In his now famous paper on Party Government (1942), E.E. Schattschneider claims that 
“political parties created democracy”, a fundamental belief which for many would still 
hold true today. Schattschneider further claims that the very thought of democracy 
without political parties was inconceivable (1942, p.1). Far from being alone in his view, 
Schattschneider’s emphasis on the role of political parties within democracy has been 
echoed numerously in the academic work in the field.  
For instance, Seymour Martin Lipset (2000) claims that political parties are 
essential to the definition of democracy. This author sustains that democracy is a political 
system that, “supplied regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing 
officials” (2000, p.48). Lipset also proposes that it signifies a “social mechanism [allowing] 
the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among 
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contenders for political office, that, through political parties” (Ibid). Lipset’s definition of 
democracy serves to further establish the important role and functions of political parties. 
Conceiving political parties as a significant mechanism employed to represent the 
interests of the population, through elections, further makes the role of political parties 
important for a representative democracy.  
Political parties are essential for democratic governance because of the functions 
they carry out. Political parties provide power to their leaders (Weber, 1922) and, they 
allow for electoral competition (Weber, 1922; Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976,1992 in 
Alcantara and Freidenberg, 2001, p.18). They also allow for the recruitment of political 
elites to operationalize the political system (Sartori, 1976,199; Von Beyme, 1982,1986 in 
Alcantara and Freidenberg, 2001, p.18) and they make political socialization possible by 
providing basic information and explanations to the population about how to understand 
reality (Alcantara, 1997). Finally political parties represent and articulate the interests of 
social groups (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Cotarelo, 1985 in Alcantara and Freidenberg, 
2001, p.18). Contemplating such characteristics makes the options to refute the 
significance of political parties minimal.  
However, the developments that political parties and the party system have 
undergone since the 70s, particularly in Latin America, have made scholars question the 
indispensability of parties for democracy and point out a paradoxical relationship 
between them (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003, p.27). Levitsky and Cameron (2003) explain 
that this paradox lies in the fact that, “although parties are considered essential to the 
effective functioning of modern democracies, they are not [necessarily] created for that 
purpose” (2003, p.27). In fact, parties might as well be “created by politicians in order to 
resolve coordination problems and further their own careers” (Aldrich, 1995 in Levitsky 
and Cameron, 2003, p. 27). Despite the fact that parties may in fact be created for 
politicians to advance their political interests, this does not necessarily imply that their 
role and functions are less significant for a stable democracy. Indeed, as mentioned 
previously, political parties allow for the mechanisms of representation to be present, and 
only this consideration, makes them indispensable for democratic regimes.  
 
Party System: Change, Institutionalization and Fragmentation 
By party system, this study follows the description provided by Martin Tanaka (1995) and 
Carlos Melendez (2012), which firstly, conceives it as the set of rules and interactions that 
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link together the political parties in a political system (1995, p.213). Secondly, a party 
system is composed of “at least two political parties that interact in structured forms” 
(Melendez, 2012, p.5). A political system consequently, is the set of rules, actors and 
interactions -formal and informal, shaping the political dynamics in a regime (Ibid). In the 
literature, party systems can be classified based not only on the number of relevant 
political parties or the ideological polarization (Sartori, 1969, p.134), but also, according 
to its degrees of institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).  
Particularly in young democracies, institutionalization is a political dimension that 
requires prime attention (Melendez 2012, p.5). Understanding what this process entails is 
thus relevant. In Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), Huntington refers to this 
concept as a process by which “formal institutions and democratic procedures acquire 
value and stability” (1968, p.12). When associating thus, the party system and 
institutionalization, Peter Mair (2006) explains that party system change is an area of 
study that needs to be explored in detail.  Moreover, Mair further determines that “… 
systemness implies institutionalization” (2006, p.66), which suggests that 
institutionalization is key for a system to ‘be’ a system.  Based on this premise, it appears 
that the lack of institutionalization of the party system does not only affect, evidently, the 
systemness of the party system, but also already de-categorize it as a system.  
Scholars interested in party system change and institutionalization, identify 
characteristics that are part of a continuum in which the party system can be found. On 
one extreme, institutionalized systems possess low levels of volatility, deep partisan 
loyalties, high political legitimacy and well-developed partisan organizations (Melendez, 
2012, p.6). On the other extreme of the continuum, the characteristics are the opposite. 
There are different conditions identified for the party system and the change it may 
undertake in order to reach institutionalization, fragmentation or even, collapse. 
Importantly, Huntington accentuates that adaptability of an institution is a requirement 
for institutionalization. Nonetheless, he recognizes that an institution, which is too 
adaptable, is unfavorable (Huntington, 1965, p.369).  
The importance of assessing party system institutionalization is primarily 
concerned with acknowledging that it represents a positive trait for the functioning of a 
stable political system and particularly, a democratic one (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; 
Mainwaring 1998, 1999). Mainwaring (1998) makes clear however, that if the levels of 
party system institutionalization are too high, they can increment its rigidity and result in 
tension within the party system (1998, p.69). 
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Considering that extreme circumstances may in fact hamper the process of value 
and stability acquisition an institution requires, it is necessary to first determine how to 
measure change to achieve institutionalization. Mainwaring (1998) differentiated key 
dimensions that indicate the levels of party system institutionalization. In fact, it seems 
that the key to a stable institution is when there is an existent balance between the 
following four dimensions: competition, rootedness, legitimacy and organization 
(Mainwaring, 1998, p.70).  
Firstly, the patterns in intern-party competition need to be stable; this is to say 
that electoral volatility should remain low, election after election. Jones (2005) explains 
that in institutionalized party systems, the relevant political parties tend to remain the 
same and also tend to “gather relatively similar shares of the vote” over time (2005, p.5). 
Secondly, when the party system is strong, political parties have solid roots in society 
(Mainwaring 1998, 1999). The electorate tends to support the same political party 
election after election, therefore, creating strong loyalties (Jones, 2005, p.7). In 
decomposing party systems, election results are based on personal characteristics of the 
political candidates (Ibid). Thus, showing that existent lack of the electorate’s political 
identification. Thirdly, the legitimacy of parties and elections is considered to be an 
important aspect of a strong party system. Scott Mainwaring (1998, 1999) established that 
a basic prerequisite for party system institutionalization is that both political parties and 
elections are to be considered legitimate by the population (Mainwaring, 1998, Jones, 
2005, p.9). As Jones (2005) further states, for parties to be legitimate, it is imperative that 
they are viewed as institutions that are vital for the functioning of the democratic system 
(2005, p.9). Lastly, the organization of the political party remains significant due to the 
fact that the structure of the party itself shows its capabilities in the political system. In 
poorly institutionalized party systems, political parties have limited resources, the 
internal processes are unpredictable, and individual party leaders dominate the parties 
(Jones, 2005, p.12).   
These four dimensions, which are distinguishable when assessing the party system, 
have allowed scholars to draw conclusions not only on the levels of institutionalization, 
but also, and relevantly to this research, how fragmentation may be identifiable. That is, 
when these dimensions are unstable, are weak or even non-existent. Accordingly and 
complemented by other indicators, such as the number of parties, party system 
fragmentation occurs when patterns of competition become highly unstable (Sanchez, 
2008, p.316), when there is a lack of partisan loyalty, and when improvised political 
parties shape the political arena. 
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Democratic Representation 
On a joint work, Mark E. Warren and Dario Castiglione (2006) reconsider democratic 
representation by conceptualizing what representation, political representation and 
democratic representation establish. Their work is useful for this research as it establishes 
the theoretical ground for determining democratic representation what conditions 
presupposes its quality.  
In her work The Concept of Representation (1967), Hanna Piktin established what 
is now considered as the formal view of ‘representation’. Pitkin identified that political 
representation involves; inter alia, authorization, accountability, and the looking out for 
another’s interests (Rehfeld, 2006, p.3). Moreover, it became noticeable that the practice 
of political representation emerged through two different processes: firstly through the 
establishment of the representative nature of the state and of its institutions, concerned 
with the act of authorization, and secondly through the emergence of a ‘representative 
government’, concerned with the extent to which representatives can be made 
accountable to the represented (Warren and Castiglione, 2006, p.3).  
The understanding of political representation was the baseline that allowed for the 
conception of democratic representation since it was “…built on an early modern, state-
centric conception of representative government” (Ibid, p.3). Though there is a wealth of 
studies that analyze the concept of political representation, either addressing the 
importance of accountability, or explaining how representation can be legitimate, it is 
essential to determine that representation needs to be considered as crucial in creating 
democratic practices (Plotke, 1997, p.19).   
Due to its important functions in shaping democratic governance, democratic 
representation has three key, yet general, characteristics that, when examined can help 
determining its quality.  Firstly, it invokes a principal-agent relationship, in which the “the 
governments [are] responsive to the interests and opinions of the people” (Warren and 
Castiglione, 2006, p.1). Secondly, representation identifies a place for political power “… to 
be exercised responsively and with a degree of accountability”, which in turn, allows 
citizens on having some “influence upon and exercise some control over it”  (Ibid, p.1).  
Thirdly, having the “right to vote for representatives, provides simple means and 
measures of political equality” (Ibid). Arguably however, democratic representation with 
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such characteristics entails a somewhat ideal relationship between quality of 
representation between the principals and agents. Nowadays, the relationship between 
these actors can be seen as mediated and enabled by many kinds of groups, organizations 
and institutions (Ibid), which makes the relationship between principals and agents more 
complex and distorted when analyzing contemporary socio-political relations. 
Ongoing contemporary developments keep on challenging the notions of the 
quality of democratic representation and can be best illustrated by explaining that the 
various forms of representation are shaped by the specific “ways people relate to their 
political communities” (Warren and Castiglione, 2006, p.2). Moreover, a predominant 
trend of the diffusion of informal structures and opportunities for democratic 
representation is occurring. The development of informal structures does not only reveal a 
“diminished role of formal political structures in social decision-making, but also the 
increasing diversification of the forms of association in modern societies” (Beck, 1997; 
Warren, 2001 in Warren and Castiglione, 2006, p.2). To a large extent, such changes are 
valuable in showing that there have been significant shifts on how democratic 
representation has to be understood and what it entails nowadays. Additionally and most 
importantly, these variations make possible to conceive a weak formal democratic 
representation since other forms and structures become more prominent.  
As seen previously, and according to Scott Mainwaring (2006), the relationship 
between the principal, the voters, and the agent, the politician and the political parties 
(2006, p.15) requires examination. Considering that political parties are the agents, whose 
role is to represent the voter’s interest, it is important to reassess this consideration 
because “the core of democratic representation lies in the relationship between citizens, 
on the one hand, and elected politicians, parties, and assemblies on the other” 
(Mainwaring et al, 2006, p.14). Realizing that there exists an institutional linkage between 
voters and their chosen representatives, traditionally established by the political parties, 
which continuously changes over time, serves to emphasize the role of these linkages in 
the literature.  
Moreover, it is widely argued that democracies need to create the appropriate 
vehicles that represent issues of collective action and those concerning social change, and 
the party system is considered to be a channel capable of addressing such challenges. Once 
fragmented however, the party system’s capacity is intensely reduced and as a result, 
democratic representation is affected. Furthermore, when the quality of democratic 
representation is comprised, new forms of representation, either formal or informal, and 
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varying linkages, are manifested. Moreover, the emergence of personalities that shape the 
political system is regarded as a clear indication of a crisis of democratic representation.  
In The Rise of Outsiders in Latin America, 1980-2010: An Institutionalist Perspective 
(2012), Miguel Carreras points out that studying the rise of outsiders in political systems 
is important due to the fact that it is connected to ongoing debates in the Political Science 
field (2012, p.1453). In fact, the rise of political outsiders signifies a liability of a 
presidentialist system since it makes possible for individuals without previous experience 
to create new parties and participate in elections (Linz, 1994, Mainwaring, 1993 in 
Carreras 2012, p. 1453).  
Suarez (1982) outlines two “pernicious consequences” of the election of political 
outsiders in presidential regimes (Suarez, 1982, p.109). Firstly, this phenomenon reduces 
the efficiency of the executive power and secondly, the rise of political outsiders allows for 
a personalist style of politics and governing (Suarez, 1982 in Carreras, 2012, p. 1453).  
Furthermore, electing outsiders will seek to develop personal bonds with the electorate, 
which according to Guillermo O’Donell (1994) involves “… bypassing intermediary 
institutions and engaging in delegative forms of democracy” (1994, p.55-59). 
Contemplating the significant effects of outsiders on governability and representative-
electorate linkage, this phenomenon of anti-establishment or anti-political personalities, 
can be considered as an important dimension that can illustrate the quality of democratic 
representation.   
 
Society-Elite Linkages 
Due to the fact that democratic governance is about “establishing linkages of 
accountability and responsiveness between citizens and the competing political elites” 
(Diamond and Gunther, 2001, p.300), an unstable political system weakens these 
dynamics. In fact, in his work Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic 
Polities, Herbert Kitschelt (2000) sustains that from the 1980s onwards empirical variance 
of linkage mechanisms has become interesting to study and has accompanied the third 
wave of democratization (2000, p. 846). What Kitschelt calls a ‘diversity of democratic 
linkage mechanisms’ is centered around a crisis of clientelist citizen-elite linkages, which 
he claims, have given rise to a crisis in European party systems, like in Italy or Austria 
(Ibid).  
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Clientelist linkages can be best illustrated by those dynamics of accountability and 
responsiveness that presuppose “delivering specific material advantages to a politician’s 
electoral supporters” (Ibid). This rather material exchange has demanded a re-
consideration of the competing studies that have mainly focused on the prominent 
programmatic linkages. Programmatic linkages have been characterized by a somewhat 
ideal perception of politician’s responsiveness, and are those concerned with politicians 
pursuing policy programs that distribute benefits and costs to all citizens, irrespective of 
their vote intention and preference (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 845).   
  On a similar line of thought, Kenneth M. Roberts (2002) argues that nowadays the 
main party-society linkages have been degenerating, and linkages described as marketing 
and personalist, become more prominent in shaping the political system at the time of 
electoral campaigns and elections (2002, p.22). As expected, these linkages trends have 
several important implications for democratic representation in Latin America, since they 
establish a scenario in which the quality of democratic representation and its structure is 
challenged. Based on marketing and personalist considerations to exercise the right to 
choose representatives, the ties between society and those who represent them, may be 
weak or unstable, resulting in hindering the quality of representation. 
 
Conceptualization 
Party system fragmentation implies instability, decay and weakness of the party 
system. Two dimensions employed to examine party system fragmentation are derived 
from the party institutionalization literature, competition and rootedness. It should be 
clear that institutionalization and fragmentation are not regarded as concepts signifying 
the same phenomenon, but mainly that the former and the indicators that determine it, 
are employed as a reference to determine how fragmentation is determined.  
Democratic representation in this study follows the definition by Mainwaring, it is 
the relationship between voters and their elected representatives in a democratic regime 
(2006, p.12). Whilst there exists a wealth of considerations that can influence democratic 
representation, three specific indicators are selected from the literature to determine the 
quality of democratic representation: Political outsiders, trust in institutions and clientelist 
linkages. 
Outsiders are defined in this study based on two conceptual approaches developed 
by Robert R. Barr (2009, p.33) and Miguel Carreras (2012, p.1456). Thus, in a context of 
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presidential elections, an outsider is (1) a candidate who does not have any previous 
political experience at the time of the electoral campaign and (2) someone who gains 
political support not in association with a competitive or traditional political party. Trust 
in institutions is a rather straightforward concept as it refers to the electorate’s trust 
towards de core institutions and relevant to this research, to political parties. Clientelist 
linkages are defined in this study as having a nature of direct exchange of goods and 
“material advantages” (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 853) between the representatives and the 
electorate. 
Central to this study is to examine the relationship between party system 
fragmentation and democratic representation. Departing from the observations made by 
Kitschelt and Roberts, this study argues that party system fragmentation further affects 
the quality of democratic representation by weakening the party-society linkages that 
shape the relationship between society and the political elites. Moreover, this relationship 
can be identified examining the dimensions of party system fragmentation and of the 
quality of democratic representation.  
It is expected that high electoral volatility and low, or non-existent, party 
competition, contribute into making more feasible for a political outsider to gain support 
and be elected. Moreover, if parties are not rooted in society, there is unstable competition, 
parties emerge and disappear, the capacity of political parties as vehicles for 
representation will be questioned and distrusted by the electorate. Therefore, this study 
argues that when political parties do not act as mechanisms of representation, the 
electorate and the elites may engage in developing other forms of linkages that shape the 
relationship with their representatives. 
Overall, the literature identifies that party system change has significant 
consequences for democracy (Tanaka, 2003, 2008; Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 1998; 
Levitsky and Cameron, 2002). The current study aims to show that in fact, the relationship 
between party system fragmentation and democratic representation can be examined 
along the dimensions listed previously, and results in affecting the quality of democratic 
representation. Moreover, it is expected that this study’s empirical results will not only 
show how democratic representation is affected by party system fragmentation, but also, 
how it has contributed to what Mainwaring and Tanaka have called, a “crisis of democratic 
representation”. Mainwaring (2006) explains that a crisis of democratic representation 
reveals the extinction of strong political parties, which in turn, allows for the rise of 
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political outsiders and the rejection of the political establishment (2006, p.13). Addressing 
the interaction between these phenomena, the following hypotheses are thus formulated.  
Null Hypothesis (H0): There is no identifiable influence between party system 
fragmentation and the quality of democratic representation in Peru. 
Alternative Hypothesis (Ha): There is an identifiable influence between party system 
fragmentation and the quality of democratic representation in Peru.  
In order to address the relationship between party system fragmentation and 
democratic representation theoretically, and establish how a crisis of democratic 
representation occurs, the Neo-Institutional theoretical approach serves as a starting 
point. The significance of this approach lies in the fact that it stresses that the actual 
“organization of political life makes a difference” (March and Olsen, 2006, p.1). Neo-
Institutionalism is best defined as the “set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning 
the relations between institutional characteristics and political agency, performance and 
change” (Ibid).  This approach is therefore relevant to the analysis intended to be 
employed in this research. Neo-Institutionalists not only emphasize that institutions have 
an impact upon individuals, but also acknowledge that there is an interaction between 
institutions and individuals (Marsh and Stoker, 2010, p.61). This interaction is that which 
is of most interest for subsequent analysis in this study.  
Though particularly useful in framing the vital role of institutions and their 
interactions with the individual, Neo-Institutionalism is limited when addressing the 
linkages that presuppose accountability and responsiveness. As Kitschelt (2000) suggests, 
“parties in the institutional sense are not always parties in the functional sense”, this is to 
say, “they are not necessarily the collective vehicles that solve problems of collective 
action and of collective choice” (2000, p.848). For this reason, it is pertinent to examine 
the theoretical debate accounting for the linkage mechanisms between society and 
politicians.  
In Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities (2000), Herbert 
Kitschelt developed a theoretical outline highly applicable to the focus of this study. 
Kitschelt begins by establishing that democracy is the only regime in which “institutional 
rules of competition between candidates, who aspire to become political representatives 
and exercise authority”, “make rules accountable and responsive to the political 
preference distribution among all competent citizens” (2000, p. 845). This assessment 
when viewed from normative political theory represents a favorable argument supporting 
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democracy (Ibid). Furthermore, the accountability and responsiveness performed by 
political parties and characteristic of democratic representation, is the focus of this study. 
Kitschelt’s contribution therefore, is applicable to this research because it challenges the 
assumption that “above all, programmatic linkages matter for democratic accountability 
and responsiveness” (Ibid, p.847), since this study argues that these linkages are no longer 
prominent in Latin America.  
Moreover, Kitschelt emphasizes the need to focus on a “more systemic, 
comparative account of diversity in the models of democratic accountability and 
responsiveness” (Ibid, p.847), these being as described previously, the linkages that are 
strongly influenced by personalistic or clientelistic traits. This study therefore aims to 
contribute to theory-building on linkage mechanisms between the citizens and 
representatives, through examining how party system fragmentation influences the 
quality of democratic representation. Thus, a theory-confirming approach in line with 
Kitschelt analysis and Mainwaring’s conceptualization of a crisis of democratic 
representation is employed.  
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Chapter 3. Research Design  
Defining the research question driving social science research is the logical starting point 
for subsequent analysis, wherein the current study is no exception. As introduced initially, 
the focus of this study lies in describing how party system fragmentation influences the 
quality of democratic representation in Peru, in order to explain the crisis of democratic 
representation argues to be taking place in this country. In this chapter, the research 
design developed in order to answer this question is established. The method of analysis 
that is employed together with the case selection and temporality considerations, are 
subsequently explained.  
 
Method of Analysis  
Due to the fact that is it hardly possible to “… construct meaningful causal 
explanations without good description, and in turn, description loses most of its interest 
unless linked to some causal relationships” (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, p.34), 
exercising both remains essential when carrying out social science research. In the current  
research, the causality observed is the influence of party system fragmentation on the 
quality of democratic representation. It must be noted however, that this causality is not 
one-sided and, as it will be shown, these phenomena, due to their temporal development, 
hold a mutual inter-relation. This is because, despite the implied causal relationship being 
the main focus of this study, it will also be argued that a crisis of democratic 
representation inhibits party system reconstruction. Acknowledging this interdependence 
between the issues of interest, allows political science research to have a holistic  
perspective and avoid reducing the analysis to a few separated variables (Pierce, 2008, 
p.43).  
In order to examine the complex yet appealing relationship between party system 
and democratic representation, examined through the fragmentation of the former and 
the quality of the latter, this study employs a qualitative method of analysis focused on a 
single case study, the case of Peru. This method allows for inductive analysis that “is 
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premised on discovering categories and being exploratory with open questions” (Vromen 
in Marsh and Stoker 2010, p. 257). Moreover, employing a qualitative method serves to 
demonstrate “sensitivity to context” (Pierce, 2008, p. 43) since the analysis will consider 
social, historical and temporal context from which the data has been gathered (Marsh and 
Stoker, 2010, p. 257). Schmitter (2008) emphasizes that “carefully constructed narratives 
remain key in understanding processes”, in this case these are party system fragmentation 
and a crisis of democratic representation, “that have a strong temporal dimension” 
(Hancké in Marsh and Stoker, 2010, p. 242). This study therefore, primarily addresses the 
observed causality considering the following temporal dimensions: sequence, context and 
change.  
Accordingly, addressing sequence, the fragmentation of the party system in Peru 
has been concurred to take place in the beginning of the late 1980s (Tanaka, 2002, p.6; 
Levistky and Cameron, p.6; Cotler, 1994; Lynch, 1999; Planas, 2000), and, the qualityof 
democratic representation became evidently in peril from the early 1990s onwards. 
Throughout the 1990s and continuing during the 2000s, the mutual inter-relation 
between these phenomena has been evident.  
Regarding the context, the qualitative method involves taking into account other 
factors that may have affected the quality of democratic representation and contributed to 
a crisis of democratic representation. On of these factors can be the structural changes in 
Peru, e.g., growth of the informal sector and development and spread of mass media 
technologies (Levistky and Cameron, 2003, p.1). Moreover, the profound effect of the 
armed conflict between the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Peruvian state (late 
70s-early 90s) on the political system, must not be overlooked.  
Lastly, significant changes can have important effects on the outcome observed. It 
is not an easy task to determine which changes are significant and which are not. However, 
in the Peruvian case and taken into account in this analysis, the economic crisis that hit the 
Latin American region in the 1970s, is arguably a factor to consider since it demanded 
urgent responses from the political actors in these countries (Tanaka, 2002, p.1), shaping 
thus the forms of governability employed these years.  
Having determined the value of the qualitative method, this study employs the 
“process tracing” approach in order to analyze extensively the relationship implied. The 
process-tracing approach is useful for this analysis because it involves identifying and 
examining other mechanisms or “different paths” that lead to the outcome observed 
(George and Bennett, 2055, p.215). In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
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phenomena of interest therefore, employing this approach within the current qualitative 
analysis is applicable. It allows establishment of the paths that lead to a crisis of 
democratic representation by determining party system fragmentation and examining the 
quality of democratic representation.  
The process-tracing approach is a subunit analysis that is useful in elaborating 
causal mechanisms that increase the number of theoretical relevant observations (King, 
Keohane and Verba, 1995, p. 227), and this is a significant goal this research aims to 
achieve. It is again worth mentioning, that the focus of this study is theory-confirming, 
since it is expected to conclude that the quality of democratic representation has been 
influenced by party system fragmentation thus contributing to a crisis of democratic 
representation. 
As introduced in the first chapter, dimensions and conditions have been observed 
to indicate party system fragmentation and the quality of democratic representation 
respectively. Regarding the party system, the indicators of fragmentation will be analyzed 
and are listed as follows; inter-party competition, rootedness in society and the number of 
parties. The quality of democratic representation in turn, is approached by analyzing the 
following indicators; emergence of outsiders, clientelist linkages and trust in institutions.  
Process-tracing involves looking closely at “the decision processes by which 
various initial conditions are translated into outcomes” (George and McKeown, 1985: 35), 
and this feature is highly relevant for analysis in this study. Due to the fact that decision-
making actions and intentions are observable conditions that reconstruct the expected 
outcome (King, Keohane and Verba, 1995, p. 227), in this case a crisis of democratic 
representation, process-tracing highlights the importance of reaching the level of the 
individual actor. Considering that this study argues that the citizen-representative 
linkages, constituting the quality of democratic representation have been affected by party 
system fragmentation and have resulted in giving rise to different relationships, analysis 
reaching the individual actor level is necessary to explain how a crisis of democratic 
representation exists.  
It has been argued that the qualitative method runs the risk of using sources of  
bias and inefficiency (King, Keohane and Verba, 1995, p.229), and thus delivering an 
unreflective research design. Taking this weakness into serious consideration, this 
research employs a variety of data sources in order to avoid inefficiency. The data this 
study relies on therefore, comes primarily from the academic literature with the intention 
to provide a comprehensive story of the Peruvian case. Moreover, by employing the 
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process-tracing approach, the number of observations has been expanded and this allows 
for greater, yet relevant, information delivery. In order to measure the indicators of the 
phenomena central to this study, secondary data and quantitative data from academic 
journals, electoral results, public opinion polls and surveys, is used for analysis in this 
study.  
 
Case Selection and Time Frame  
The literature suggests that the levels of dissatisfaction with the political system have 
been most severe in the Andean Region (Mainwaring et al, 2006 and Tanaka, 2003), which 
is comprised by Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru. Accordingly, a divergence 
between the state and the citizens in terms of the linkages that presuppose their socio-
political relationship has been more acute in these countries (Burt and Mauceri, 2004; 
Drake and Hershber, 2006).  
In the Andean Region, only Colombia and Venezuela were regarded as holding a 
stable, firm and valued party system. In Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, the party systems were 
described as inchoate. Overall however, in all five Andean countries, during the 70s and 
80s, the party systems became fragmented and collapsed. Particularly interesting is the 
Peruvian case, which illustrates how party system fragmentation from the late 80s 
onwards, represented an opening for political instability and democratic uncertainty 
(Tanaka and Vera, 2010, p.35).  
Peruvian politics contain contradictory and complex trends that characterize the 
political system (Aldrich, 1995, Levitsky and Cameron, 2003, Tanaka 1998, Tanaka 2002)  
and these are considered to have challenged, and even endangered, the democratization 
process (Woy-Hazleton and Hazleton, 1990, p.21). Electoral volatility has been the highest 
in Peru since the restoration of democracy in 1980. Moreover, the frequent shift in party 
support and loyalties has characterized Peruvian politics since the 1990s onwards. 
Political outsiders such as Alberto Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo and Ollanta Humala, and 
their rather new political parties at the time (1990, 1999, 2003 respectively), have all won 
presidential elections in Peru in 1990, 2001 and 2011 respectively. High volatility in Peru 
does not only reflect a shift in electoral preferences but also how quickly new parties 
emerge and old ones collapse.  
In addition, the majority of the elected presidents of the last two decades have 
reaffirmed their consistent rejection of the establishment. These candidates have 
22 
 
employed and identified their electoral campaigns as highly clientelist. These conditions 
come to represent a rather puzzling political system and indicate the urgency to examine 
the indicators shaping this reality. In line with the focus of this study, determining what 
presupposes a crisis in democratic representation in Peru holds several implications. 
The implications of studying the Peruvian case hold both academic and social value. 
By gaining in-depth understanding of a crisis of democratic representation, a multi-
dimensional observation can help explain what mechanisms interact in shaping it and 
which are in particular more salient and need to be re-examined. The Peruvian case can 
contribute to the academic literature by offering insights of the democratization process in 
Latin America. Furthermore, examining Peruvian politics help distinguishing the actual 
limitations and weaknesses of the democratization process. Considering these 
implications, it seems rather fitting to have selected a case study that can contribute to our 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms shaping the political system academically 
and socially.  
Having discussed and established the value of the temporal dimension that 
involves studying party system fragmentation and democratic representation in Peru, the 
time frame selected for analysis ranges from 1980-2011. This period of thirty-one years is 
useful in illustrating a temporal development of all the indicators of party system 
fragmentation and the mechanisms of democratic representation that determine its 
quality. As it has been explained previously, party system fragmentation occurred in the 
late 1980s and variations of the quality of democratic representation followed this 
phenomenon from 1990 onwards. 
Examining the results of the presidential elections that took place since 1980 to 
2011, is significant to establish the temporal development of these phenomena. 
Furthermore, thirty-one years will allow observing a, claimed party system fragmentation 
that may in fact contribute to a crisis of democratic representation present in the Peruvian 
political system. This period of time may in fact represent both the weakness and strength 
of this study. Regarding the former, even if observation is conducted thoroughly, the 
relationship observed may in fact not be as salient or possess a trend overall. Regarding 
the strength of this study, a long time frame will allow for a multi-dimensional observation 
to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomena in Peru. These considerations are 
further explained in the implications and limitations chapters, after employing the 
research design outlined throughout this section.  
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Chapter 4. Latin American and Peruvian Politics 
In Latin America, and specifically concerning Peruvian politics, understanding the context 
in which the party system fragmented and how the quality of democratic representation 
has been affected, is highly necessary. According to Julio Cotler, a prominent Peruvian 
scholar who’s famous work Clases, Estado y Nación (1978) examines and describes the 
development of the Peruvian state and the political system in this country, a reading of 
Peruvian history is indispensable to an understanding of the present (Crabtree, 2011, p.1). 
Before fully diving into the contextual development of Peruvian politics, it is relevant to 
describe and examine Omar Sanchez’ grouping of ‘underlying causes’ of party system 
fragmentation and democratic representation in Latin America. By acknowledging the 
existence of environmental conditions in Latin America, the first part of this section 
stresses the important influence these have had on the political institutions’ organization 
and stability throughout the southern region of the continent.  
Firstly, once characterized by a strong ideological fervor, ideology in Latin America 
is no longer conceived as the main factor for voters to elect their representatives and for 
parties to win electoral campaigns. Therefore, the region seems to have entered and to be 
experiencing a post-ideological era (Castaneda, 1994; Colburn, 2002). One could argue 
however, that the left-turn, as seen in different levels in the cases of Venezuela, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina in the last 10 years, challenge this idea. The previous and 
current political leaders in these countries however, i.e., Chavez, Correa and Morales, did 
not rely on political ideology as the heart of their electoral campaign and governance, but 
they focused rather on anti-system rhetoric.  These leftists leaders have arisen from a 
mixed past that includes populism, nationalism and as a consequence, with few ideological 
underpinnings (Castaneda, 2006).  
Secondly, during the 1980s Latin America was hit by a heavy economic crisis that 
resulted in affecting governability in the region, most notably and gravely in Brazil, Mexico 
and Argentina. Though economic debt was more paralyzing in these countries, the whole 
region experienced it and decisive economic reforms took place. A large scale, Neoliberal 
reorganization resulted in limiting the functions and reducing the size of the state 
(Vellinga, 1998 in Sanchez, 2008, p.316). These reforms are important to consider because 
they influence the functioning of not only the state, but also the political parties. From the 
1990s onwards, political parties have been unable to deliver policy privileges or material 
benefits like they used to (Ibid, p.317). The central role in the political system played by 
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political parties thus, was further weakened by instituting economic reforms resulting in 
restricting political agency.  
Thirdly, as a result of continuous socio-economic reforms taking place in the 
region, the growth of the informal labor sector is a relevant factor to consider. According 
to Sabatini and Farnsworth (2006), an expanding informal labor sector results in 
composing an electoral group that is not attached to organized channels of political 
participation any longer (2006, p.55-62) Moreover, as claimed by Sanchez, the growing 
informal labor sector surely demands capabilities that traditional political parties are not 
able to exercise (Sanchez, 2008, p.317). These conditions result  in disenchantment and 
distrust, with and towards the political system. Nonetheless, Levitsky and Cameron (2003) 
argue that different forms of informal party organization2 have eroded in the region and 
adaptability to external circumstances has taken place (2003, p.2).  
Finally, the access to, and development of mass media technologies has further 
hampered the main role of political parties in structuring their party-organization building 
(Skidmore, 1993 in Sanchez, 2008, p.317). Television has specially weakened the 
incentives of politicians to engage in the organization of the political parties. Sanchez 
argues that in a mass media era, “telegenic political outsiders can potentially challenge 
well established, well organized party machines” (Ibid, p.317). Moreover, the increasing 
popularity of social networks and the access to a wealth of available information on the 
internet, clearly posits challenges to the conventional electoral campaign strategies held 
by political parties. Political presence is not judged only on television and radio slogans 
and appearances, but also on the extent to which political leaders are involved and 
represented in social media networks.  
The factors outlined here are considered to be underlying multifaceted causes that 
have the power to shape the nature of the political sphere in a manner that is out of the 
control of the political parties themselves (Sanchez, 2008, p.317). According to Steven 
Levistky and Maxwell Cameron however, some of these indicators do not directly cause 
party systems to collapse, but rather, they may in fact “inhibit its reconstruction” (Levitsky 
and Cameron, 2003, p.25). Whether these conditions cause party system fragmentation or 
impede its reconstruction is not a task this research is directly concerned in debating. 
What is more relevant to argue is that these factors clearly influence political parties by 
limiting their agency and also, result in affecting the electorate’s behavior. Thus, these 
factors shape an even more complex political scenario, in which ‘the rules of the game’ are 
                                                 
2 See Informal Organization of Political Parties in Latin America . Levitsky and Freidenberg (2007). 
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in constantly changing and the quality of democratic representation is thus affected. The 
Peruvian case is particularly appealing in this regard, as Julio Cotler (1995) claims politics 
in Peru have consistently been unpredictable (Cotler, 1995 in Mainwaring and Scully, 
1995, p.323). The following section thus, focuses in detail on the puzzling Peruvian 
considering the economic, political and social context between 1960 and 1990.  
The deepening of democracy, claims John Crabtree (2011), has been absent in Peru 
despite the fact that constitutional governments have been upheld (2011, p.xviii). From 
the 1960s onwards, attempts to get rid of the old Peruvian regime aiming to modernize 
the country, were made (Crabtree, 2011, p.56). In fact, “social change and the emergence 
of both new political actors and political parties, brought attempts to outdated social 
structures” (Ibid). The creation of Acción Popular (AP) in 1956, founded by Fernando 
Belaunde, and the Partido Demócrata Cristiano founded in 1966 by Luis Bedoya are 
examples of the previously mentioned new political parties and actors. However, due to a 
successful and strong old regime, political movements and parties were forced to plea 
support from the mobilized sectors of the population by employing “… assistentialist 
policies that reaffirmed old populist ties” (Ibid). Such policies and resistance to reform, 
exacerbated institutional weakness and contributed to a political breakdown whereby  “no 
political regime endured for a long as two decades” (Kenney, 2004, p. 6). 
While Peru has experienced semi-democratic and democratic governance from the 
1900s until the 1960s, when democracy was interrupted by military and authoritarian 
regimes. Most notably, the military intervention of 1968 led by General Velasco Alvarado, 
lasted no less than 12 years. Velasco, though a representative of the military forces, 
employed reforms that had popular support, remarkably the so-called “agrarian 
revolution”, which concentrated on agrarian reforms that re-distributed rural land 
ownership (Cotler, 1994). Crabtree emphasizes that despite Velasco’s reforms on land-
ownership and popular economic policies, patterns of political patrimonialism, heritage of 
the post-colonial era, persisted in Peru (Kenney, 2004, p.6). Velasco’s military rule and 
reforms led the country to a deep economic crisis, which had to be faced when the country 
transitioned back to democracy in 1980 and Fernando Belaunde was reelected as 
president, since his electoral win in 1963, ended abruptly with Velasco’s military coup in 
October of 1968. 
In 1978, the New Constitution, part of the Peruvian Presidentialist system, was 
approved with the objective to “return to democracy after military rule”, and determined 
significant reformations to the electoral system from1980 onwards (Peruvian Congress 
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Report, 1980). The most important reformations were: Firstly, the general elections would 
elect collectively the president, the congress members, and the vice-president for a period 
of 5 years. Secondly, it established a two run-off system, in which a president would be 
elected if obtaining a minimum of 50 percent of total vote support. If less than 50 percent, 
the two parties with the highest vote share, would compete in a second round. Thirdly, it 
provided the president as entitled to have more power capacity to employ social reforms 
(Peruvian Congress Report, 1980). 
Belaunde returned to power in 1980 when the AP won the presidential elections, 
marking thus an end to the military rule (Kenney, 2004, p. 18). The economic crisis was 
the main challenge Belaunde’s administration faced. In fact, by 1982, the GDP fell by 2.2 
percent and by an unforeseen 14.6 percent a year later (Kenney, 2004, p.11-21). In 
addition, inflation figures were unprecedented as they went from 75 to 125 percent 
during these years (Ibid). The deepening of the ongoing economic crisis in the country has 
been correlated with Belaunde’s “IMF-style austerity program” (Burgees and Levitsky, 
2003, p.898). Belaunde’s term ended in 1985, when Alan Garcia, leader of the Alianza 
Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), was elected as president.  
Originally a labor-based party, The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana 
(APRA), founded in 1930, is considered the oldest political party in Peru. Founded by 
Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, APRA is commonly regarded as the only party that has 
maintained, though at times remarkably low, electoral support since the 1980s. During the 
1960s, APRA was often involved in corruption and though formed in 1930, only gained 
formal recognition in 1962 (Kenney, 2004, p.6). Because APRA’s involvement in 
frustrating Belaunde’s “legislative program” in the 1960s, which lead to the military coup 
of 1968, the political party was still seen as a threat and was somewhat excluded from the 
political scene until 1985 (Ibid), when it won the presidential elections.  
During the 1980s, besides the deep economic crisis in the Andean country, social 
turmoil unfolded in Peru with the presence of Sendero Luminoso, a “Marxist, Maoist and 
Leninist” radical revolutionary movement (CVR, 2003, p.14). Sendero Luminoso or The 
Shining Path declared war to the Peruvian state in 1980, when the country witness the 
beginning of an armed struggle that was deepened from 1985 onwards (Ibid). The radical 
movement exposed the inequality and social exclusion prevalent in the country and 
condemned the failure of the state in confronting these issues. The struggle between 
Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian state, resulted in an armed conflict that lasted until 
the early 1990s. During the 1980s, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) 
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was formed. MRTA was another radical revolutionary movement that increased the social 
turmoil that shaped the state of emergency in the country (Ibid, p.254). States of 
emergency were established in ten of the twenty-four departments, restricting the civil 
and political liberties of one half of the Peruvian population in 1990 (Woy-Hazleton and 
Hazleton, 1990, p. 21). The political and armed violence between the state and the radical 
movements betwen 1980 and 1992, is reponsible for over 70 thousand lives, according to 
the Comision de la Verdad y la Reconciliación3 (CVR, 2003, p.115).  
By 1985, the Peruvian political system was challenged by an incontrollable 
economic crisis characterized by hyperinflation and the armed conflict that paralyzed the 
country for longer than a decade. So when Alan Garcia (APRA) was elected in 1985, his 
term was associated with widespread corruption, which Crabtree (2011) claims, resulted 
from “rampant patrimonalism and contributed all in all to a failed government of 
heterodox policies” (2011, p.57).  
Despite the fact that the political forces in Peru resembled more social movements 
than parties (Cotler, 1995 in Cabtree, 2011, p.10), between 1980-1990, the APRA, AP, PPC 
and Izquierda Unida (IU), were considered the four-sustaining parties of the party system 
(Tanaka, 2002, p.2). IU was founded in 1980 and it was the only political force that 
represented a leftist vote. By 1990, “none of the four system-sustaining parties could 
demonstrate that it had the capacity to confront a multifaceted crisis: economic collapse, 
organizational weakness, and Sendero Luminoso” (Dietz and Myers, 2007, p.75). These 
conditions can help explaining why in 1990, an anti-establishment candidate such as 
Alberto Fujimori was elected.  
In 1992, Fujimori “made every effort to ensure that no opposition parties received 
any help from the state” (Tuesta, 1996; Conagham, 2001 in Dietz and Myers, 2007, p.77). 
Furthermore, Fujimori “seized power in an autogolpe” or ‘self-coup’, when he dissolved 
the congress in 1992 and claimed to start the “national reconstruction” of the Peruvian 
political system (Tanaka, 1998, p.220-221). His move, though criticized internationally, 
was accepted and supported by the population as he “jumped from a 53 percent of 
support in March of 1992, to a 81 percent after the autogolpe” (Tanaka, 1998, in Levitsky 
and Cameron, 2003, p.8). In 1993, a New Constitution was approved via a national 
referendum and it established the consecutive presidential re-election (Tanaka, 1998, 
p.221). In 1995 thus, with an imposing 62,4 percent Fujimori is re-elected. Fujimori’s 
                                                 
3 Truth and Reconciliation Commission installed during the interim term of Valentín Paniagua,  
2000-2001. 
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regime, which turned a democratic election into an “authoritarian success” (Levitsky and 
Cameron, 2003, p.8), greatly affected the stability political system in Peru between 1990-
2001.  
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Chapter 5. Party System Fragmentation in Peru 
 
As introduced in the previous chapters, the literature has been concerned with identifying 
several dimensions that comprise the party system and that are useful in understanding 
party system change, and relevant to this study, fragmentation. Accordingly, these 
dimensions can be measured separately by focusing on specific indicators. 
In this study, Party System Fragmentation is operationalized by examining three 
dimensions selected from the literature: Inter-Party Competition, Party Roots in Society 
and the Number of Parties.  
Competition and rootedness are determined by the most commonly used 
indicators of the party system, electoral volatility in the case of competition, and party 
support and/or identification accounting for rootedness. Additionally, analyzing 
specifically the number of parties, is determining the Effective Number of Parties (ENP). 
The ENP is an indicator predominantly used to determine the levels of party system 
fragmentation. Collectively, these indicators will provide a clear image of the Peruvian 
party system. Moreover, the results will permit the drawing of inferences on party system 
fragmentation in Peru.  
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 Inter-Party Competition 
 
Stability in the tendencies of Inter-Party Competition is determined by electoral 
volatility. Electoral volatility refers to the “net change within the electoral party system 
resulting from individual vote transfers” (W. Ascher and S. Tarrow, 1976, p.48). Thus, 
measuring volatility allows determining the percentage of the electorate that modifies 
their political preferences from one election to another. Volatility in this study is examined 
by relying on the measure developed by Pedersen in 1979, with high levels indicating 
higher volatility (Jhones, 2005, p.5), implying instability and weak inter-party competition. 
  
In Party Systems in the Third Wave, Mainwaring (1998) provides the scores for 
electoral volatility post-1980 for the established advanced industrial democracies, the old 
European and the new Latin American democracies. When comparing the mean results of 
electoral volatility between Europe and Latin America, the differences are remarkable. In 
the former, the mean volatility reaches a 9.7 percent, whereas if focusing ten Latin 
American democracies, the mean is approximately 30 percent. In the Andean Region, the 
mean volatility is even higher, at 37 percent between 1970-1990.  
 
In Peru, the electoral volatility score had a mean of 54 percent between 1980 and 
1990, the highest in the Andean Region during these years. As Table 1 shows, electoral 
volatility was prominently high in Peru during the 1980s.  In order to assess how 
significant the high volatility figures are, the following table compares Peru’s volatility 
results to the rest of the Andean Countries. Moreover, it shows an overview of the 
electoral volatility in the region.   
 
Table 1. Electoral Volatility in the Andean Region between 1979-1990 
 
Source: Mainwaring and Scully (1995, p. 8).  
  
Electoral 
Period(s) 
 
Time Spam 
(1979-1990) 
 
Mean Volatility: 
Presidential Vote 
% 
Peru 2 1980-1990 54.0 
Bolivia 4 1979-1993 39.2 
Ecuador 3 1979-1992 43.2 
Colombia 5 1970-1990 10.9 
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As seen in Table 1, Peru scores 54 percent, the highest electoral volatility in the 
Andean Region. This value is higher than Bolivia and Ecuador by almost 17 percent and 
more than 40 percent higher than Colombia’s mean volatility. As such, party competition 
during the 1980s in Peru is reflected by high volatility figures that not only illustrate 
constant vote variation but also, as the following observations will show, party system 
fragmentation since the patterns of competition are unstable in Peru. 
Electoral volatility serves not only to examine party competition, it also makes it 
possible to observe varying patterns in the party system, e.g., in the distribution of 
electoral support among the relevant political forces. Thus, looking at the voting 
percentage shared by the competing Peruvian parties during the 1980s, allows assessing 
the shifts in vote preference. In fact, the 1980 and 1985 Peruvian general election results, 
show how four political parties, PPC, AP, APRA and IU together gathered an average of 
almost 85 percent of the electoral support. Such high figures expressed in vote 
percentages, allow the establishment of these parties as the principal, relevant political 
forces of the 1980s in Peru.  
By 1990 however, there was a considerable decline in electoral support for these 
four principal parties. Actually, it is possible to observe a clear tendency of declining 
support towards the relevant parties of the 1980s up to the 2000s. In order to visually 
observe such tendencies, Graph 1 shows this declining trend in Peru from 1980 to the year 
2000.  
 
Graph 1. Vote Percentage to Principal Parties in General Elections between 1980-2000 
Sources: Personal elaboration based on data from ONPE4. 
 
                                                 
4 ONPE is the National Office of Electoral Processes. 
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Graph 1 provides significant evidence of the strong decline trend of the total vote 
percentage gathered by the four main political parties between 1980 and 2000. Between 
1980 and 1985, electoral support rose from 84 percent to a grand 96.9 percent. From 
1990 onwards however, an imposing and continuous decline occurred with the 
percentages shared by these four political parties. Accordingly, in 1990, the vote 
percentage shared between the four parties declined to a 63.3 and strikingly, to a 9.7 and 
1.8 in the 1995 and 2000 general elections respectively.  
The 1990 results, Tanaka explains, illustrate how the principal political parties of  
the 1980s, followed a path to their “political extinction” (Tanaka, 2002, p.2). The following 
four graphs show the decline of support to the principal parties of the 1980s during the 
general elections between 1980-2000 based on the vote percentage they obtained 
individually.  
 
Graph 1a. Electoral Support for Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA)  
 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data from ONPE. 
 
Graph 1b. Electoral Support for Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC)  
 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data from ONPE.  
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Graph 1c. Electoral Support for Acción Popular (AP) 
 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data from ONPE. 
 
Graph 1d. Electoral Support for Izquierda Unida (IU) 
 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data from ONPE. 
Collectively, Graph 1a to 1d provide a detailed account of how each relevant 
political party of the 1980s lost the popular support in the presidential elections in two 
decades. A couple of considerations can be made regarding what support decline meant 
for each political party. APRA, considered the oldest political party in Peru, experienced 
remarkable vote shift during the 1980s. Such variations in electoral support, allowed the 
party to win elections in 1985, though the party quickly lost support in the following three 
general elections. Only APRA can be regarded as the party system that barely survived 
party extinction, as Alan Garcia is reelected in 2001.  
 
Regarding PPC and AP, both experienced a strong drop in electoral support over 
twenty years. Though the former experienced more variation in electoral support, it only 
managed to obtain a maximum of 12 percent during twenty years. AP in turn, was 
considered to have a strong party tradition as it was elected in the 60s and in 1980, but 
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general elections. Such adverse results experienced by AP and PPC, forced both parties to 
make major decisions in order to survive extinction. This was manifested in the coalition 
AP and PPC formed in 1988, FREDEMO, that included a political movement called 
Movimiento Libertad, lead by novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. Thus, in the elections of 1990, 
FREDEMO was able to obtain 32,6 percent. AP and PPC are shown to have 0 support in the 
general elections of 1990 since neither party gathered votes independently.  
Lastly, Graph 1c shows how IU managed to obtain almost 25 percent of electoral 
support in the 1985 elections, a striking figure when compared to that of almost 3 percent 
in 1980. From 1990 onwards however, IU’s electoral support was subjected to the 
predominant declining trend taking place in Peru. By the 2000 general elections, the 
political party did not even appeared in the voting ballot.  
The observed variability in voting preference during the mid 1980s onwards and 
the high electoral volatility in the country during this decade, offers a clear image of the 
party competition in the country. The information provided illustrates that a volatile party 
competition began in Peru in 1985 and became prominent in the 1990 general elections. 
In fact, in 1990, the political scene witnessed a new political party, Cambio 90, winning the 
general elections by gathering 29,2 percent in the first election and 62,4 percent in the 
runoff.  
Considering that the time frame of this study aims to examine inter-party 
competition up to the year 2011, it is necessary to provide the scores of electoral volatility 
in Peru from 1990 onwards. As shown initially in this chapter, between 1980-1990, the 
electoral volatility mean scored 54 percent in Peru. In the general elections that followed 
in 1990 and up to 2011, the scores vary considerably. Graph 2 provides the trend and 
fluctuations of aggregated electoral volatility scores in Peru up to 2011. 
 
Graph 2. Aggregated Electoral Volatility in Peru, 1990-2011 
 
Source: Margarita Batlle (2012) based on data from ONPE.  
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Overall, this section shows that electoral volatility scores and voting preference in 
Peru are high, but not continuously so throughout during the 2000s. During the 1980s, 
though volatility was high in Peru, the four main political parties obtained no less than 85 
percent of electoral support. Such figures represented a positive trait regarding party 
competition in the country, especially because Peru was returning to democracy after a 
military rule that lasted 12 years. From 1990 onwards however, as Graph 2 shows, 
electoral volatility rises from 63 to 97 percent in only 10 years. Between 2001 and 2006, a 
significant decline can be observed since electoral volatility decreases from 62 to 51 
percent. Several factors can be considered to affect the increase of electoral volatility 
between 1995 and 2000 and the decrease between 2001 and 2006. The electoral scene of 
during the 1990s and 2000s allows a general image to be formed that can help understand 
the unstable party competition in Peru.  
The 1990s have been regarded as the ‘Fujimori regime’ years, since he was elected 
in 1990, reelected in 1995 and, though accused of corruption and human rights violations, 
(Levitsky and Cameron, 2003, p.21), also in 2000. As a result, Fujimori resigned the same 
year and general elections were held a year after. In the 2001 general elections, another 
new political party formed only in 1998, Peru Posible, obtained the majority of votes in a 
contented second run-off with the APRA leader Alan Garcia. In 2006, Alan Garcia was re-
elected after having been president of Peru from 1985 to 1990, running against Ollanta 
Humala. In 2011, a new coalition of new parties, Gana Peru, obtained the majority of the 
votes in the first and second run-off that took place in that year. Remarkable is the fact 
that 11 parties participated in the 2011 elections, out of which, only two, had participated 
independently in the previous elections. The phenomenon of number of parties is 
explored in detail when addressing the remaining indicators of party system 
fragmentation.  
 
Overall, the information provided in this section shows that high volatility scores 
have characterized Peruvian politics. Though lower volatility scores were observed in the 
1990s and between 2001 and 2006, high volatility has been prominent in Peru. In fact, it 
has remained at 50 percent between 1980 and 2011. The results of 2000 and 2011 are 
remarkably high, with scores of 97 and 100 percent respectively. Such scores suggest a 
very unstable competition characterizing Peruvian politics for more than 30 years. 
Though there is not a clear increasing trend overall, political competition in Peru is 
characterized by volatile competition that shows remarkable trends in electoral support 
to the numerous political parties in the country. Furthermore, the results show that 
parties are unable to hold onto stable constituencies since their electoral support changes 
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dramatically from one election to the next. Inter-party competition does not really explain 
why this occurs, but it is an indicator which helps illustrate how electoral volatility and 
vote preference variability are high in Peru.  
So far, it can be concurred that such high results in volatility affected the stability 
of the party system when looking at inter-party competition in Peru over 31 years. It is 
thus not surprising that fragmentation of the party system was characterized, among 
other factors, by unstable and volatile competition. However, in order to have a better 
understanding of party system fragmentation, it is necessary to examine and determine 
the results of the remaining indicators. Rootedness is the next dimension that will be 
examined.  
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Party Roots in Society  
 
The second dimension employed to examine party system fragmentation in this 
study is party rootedness in society. The literature identifies that a high degree of party 
rootedness is beneficial for party system stability (Mainwaring 1998, 1999). When the 
extent of party rootedness is high, voters tend to vote for the same party, election after 
election, demonstrating their political identification with the chosen party. Moreover, as 
expected, high party rootedness shows that political parties possess a high level of linkage 
with society (Johnes, 2005, p.7). In fact, the electorate has more possibilities of feeling 
connected to the party based on ideological or programmatic considerations (Melendez, 
2011, p.11), where parties have strong roots.  
Prior to an explanation of how rootedness is measured in this section, some 
considerations are needed. Since this study focuses on democratic representation and how 
the party system influences its quality, examining different linkages between the 
electorate and the agents is important. In this section therefore, when addressing party 
rootedness, the first evidence of how linkages vary, is expected to be present. This is 
because perhaps the most important aspect of party rootedness is that it indicates how 
parties fulfill their role as representative mechanisms.  
The electorate, observes Kitschelt (2000), chooses to vote for political parties that 
represent their programmatic preferences, those based on an ideal perception of the 
politician’s responsiveness (2000, p.845). Moreover, regarding ideological considerations, 
programmatic linkages are significant because they help stabilize the electoral 
competition (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006, p.204). Electoral volatility and party 
rootedness are therefore, closely interacting dimensions that moderate competition 
stability and by extension, stability of the party system as a whole. The opposite occurs 
however, when the degrees of party rootedness are low or inexistent. Accordingly, 
elections reflect voters casting their ballots “more based on the traits and characteristics” 
of the party leaders or their electoral campaign message (Johnes, 2005, p.7).  
Though the 1980 and 1985 presidential elections show that the prominent parties 
gathered a high percentage of voting support during these years (70 - 90 percent), such 
high electoral support does not necessarily imply party rootedness based on ideological 
identification. Measuring rootedness thus, implies attempting to understand both the 
electorates’ feeling of party identification and, the influence of ideology in determining a 
vote choice.  
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Based on the considerations presented thus far, rootedness is operationalized in 
this study by examining two indicators: Party Identification and Ideological or 
Programmatic Voting. Firstly, party identification is derived from surveys carried out 
during the 1980s and 2000s from three different polling companies that measured party 
support, identification and closeness. Secondly, ideological or programmatic voting during 
the 1990s is determined by evaluating the correlation between the electorate’s shift in 
preference and change in their self-consideration on an ideological right and left scale 
developed by Mainwaring and Torcal (2006). For 2011 specifically, a programmatic vote is 
examined considering survey data on the electorate’s ability to position presidential 
candidates in a left-right ideology scale.  
It is important to mention that due to data limitations concerned with the time 
frame this study envisaged (1980-2011), survey data on party identification or support in 
Peru, is only available from the late 1980s and from 2006 onwards. Taking this aspect into 
consideration, programmatic voting is determined based on data from 1990-2001 and of 
2011. Both indicators thus, allow having a somewhat general overview of party 
rootedness in Peru during the proposed time frame.  
 
 
 
Party Identification  
 
Scott Mainwaring (1998) claimed that overall in Latin America, the scores for 
identification with political parties were particularly low during the 1980s. When 
comparing the Latin American results to those found in advanced industrial democracies 
such as the European or North American, the differences were outstanding. Party 
identification in Western Europe was particularly high with levels of 60 percent or higher 
(Mainwaring, 1998, p.73). In Peru however, only around 20 percent of the surveyed 
respondents admitted to feel some form of identification with a political party (Ibid, 73).  
The following table shows the results from surveys carried out on party support 
from 1986 to 1991. Two qualitative methods were employed in these surveys. The first 
(Table 2) asked a single question: “which of the following political group do you support 
more?” The question would be then followed by a list of the representative political 
parties of the 1980s, and also including “independent” as an option. Positioning oneself as 
an independent would represent either, rejecting the current parties because of no 
support, or actual support for new political figures that were not part of the ‘traditional’ 
parties of the 1980s.  
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The second method relied on two questions, the first was: “do you support a 
political party or are you an independent?” and the second, in case the answer would 
imply agreement for party support, would be: “which political party do you support”? 
Continued Table 2 shows the results for these surveys from 1986 to 1991. This table 
illustrates the development of party support during these years in Peru.  
 
 
Table 2. Development of Support for Political Parties in Peru, 1986-1991 
 
Percentage support     
for 
 
May 1986 
 
Aug 1986 
 
Jan 1986 
APRA 
 
53 49 6 
 
IU 
-- -- 20 
 
Total FREDEMO 
8 13 24 
 
AP 
-- -- 4 
 
PPC 
8 13 8 
 
Libertad* 
-- -- 5 
 
FREDEMO* 
-- -- 7 
 
Others/No response 
11 5 15 
 
Independents 
17 20 35 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
 As mentioned previously, Libertad was founded in 1988 and FREDEMO, a coalition that 
included Libertad, AP and PPC, was also founded this year.   
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Table 2 continued Development of Support for Political Parties in Peru, 1986-1991 
 
Percent 
support for 
 
Nov 
‘86 
Oct 
‘87 
June 
‘88 
Dec 
‘88 
Apr 
‘89 
Nov 
‘89 
Dec 
‘89 
June 
‘90 
Oct 
‘90 
Oct 
‘91 
APRA 
 
25 21 13 12 7 6 6 7 5 7 
IU 
 
8 8 7 9 12 6 6 4 2 3 
Total 
FREDEMO 
 
10 12 7 11 16 13 13 29 10 14 
AP 
 
2 4 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 
PPC 
 
8 8 4 4 5 2 2 3 2 2 
Libertad 
 
-- -- 0.3 2 1 2 2 5 3 2 
FREDEMO 
 
-- -- 2 3 8 7 7 19 4 7 
Others/No 
response 
 
4 9 2 7 3 5 10 10 3 2 
Independents 
 
52 51 71 61 62 70 65 50 80 74 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: APOYO in Kenney (2004). 
 
Table 2 provides valuable information regarding the decline in support towards 
APRA and IU from the mid 1980s onwards. Considering the option of “I am an 
independent” provided in these surveys, it is possible to see that  it increases throughout 
the mid 1980s in the years that follow, reaching 60 in Dec 1988, 65 in Dec 1989 and even 
80 percent in Oct 1990. By October 1991 however, one year after the general elections 
that elected Fujimori with Cambio 90, the results for “independents”, decreased to a 74 
percent. The independent choice can be understood in 1990 as an indication of support for 
a new party or “an independent” like Fujimori.  
The results for the independent option show that a significant group of the 
electorate did not identify with any political party during these years. Accordingly, during 
the late 1980s FREDEMO, had relatively stable support. However, in 1990 and 1991, the 
coalition experienced a severe decline in support, going from 29 to 10 percent in only a 
year. Overall, data from the polling company APOYO suggests that the Peruvian electorate 
had a moderate at times, but generally, a low degree of support for political parties during 
the 1980s.  
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From 2006 until 2010, the data available to assess party rootedness relies in a 
different survey method. Graph 3 shows the results from surveys that focused on party 
identification based on a yes or no answer to the question: “do you currently identify with 
a political party?”   
 
Graph 3. Political Identification in Peru, 2006-2010 
 
Source: LAPOP, 2010, p.191.  
 
The 2006 survey was conducted a couple weeks before the runoff date of the 
general elections. The contenders were Ollanta Humala, leader of the Partido Nacionalista 
Peruano (PNP), and Alan Garcia, leading APRA. According to Zárate and Carrión (2010), 
the runoff took place within a context of profound polarization around the candidacy of 
Ollanta Humala’s  (Zárate and Carrión, 2010, p.191), a military official regarded as anti-
establishment. Considering such a context, only 30 percent of respondents identified as to 
sympathize with a political party in 2006. Partisan identification in the following surveys 
of 2008 and 2010 shows a decline of approximately 10 percent.  
 
Graph 4. Party Closeness in Peru, 2011 
 
Source: Latinobarometro survey, 2011.  
29,9 
70,1 
19,2 
80,8 
21,2 
78,8 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Yes No
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 
Responses 
"Do you currently identify with a political party?"  
2006
2008
2010
32,7 
62,2 
5,2 
0
20
40
60
80
Yes No No Reply/ Does not
know
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 
Responses 
Is there a political party you feel closer to? 
%/Total
42 
 
Graph 4 shows that in 2011, when confronted about the feeling of closeness to a 
political party, 32,7 percent responded affirmatively. A second related question was asked: 
“how partisan are you to this party?” to the respondents that said to be close to a political 
party. As seen in Graph 5, only 5 percent claimed to be “very partisan” and 17 percent said 
to have some degree of partisanship.  
 
Graph 5. Degree of Party Partisanship, 2011 
 
Source: Latinobarometro survey, 2011.  
 
Overall, party rootedness in Peruvian society during the 1980s and 2000s varied 
considerably. Such variations, as previously mentioned, somewhat explain the inability of 
political parties to maintain the electorate’s support. Why this occurs is an important 
question.  Thus, examining rootedness allows observation of several trends exercised by 
the Peruvian electorate. From the 1988 onwards, figures show that the electorate 
identified in greater levels with being ‘independent’ or supporting ‘independents’.  
Such findings demonstrate a trend, which slowly grew during the end of 1989 up 
to Oct 1990, which can be that of rejecting the traditional parties of this decade. The 
results from the 1980s shed doubt that the traditional parties of the 1980s actually had 
constituencies. From 2006 up to 2010, it was observed that the around 75 percent of 
Peruvian electorate, did not feel identified with a political party. Such a figure, barely 
decreased by 2 percent between 2008 and 2010, indicates that the Peruvian electorate felt 
little representation of their interests and inclinations by existing political parties.  
Considering the latest survey of 2011, though based on a different question about 
how close Peruvians felt to a political party, the results show that 32 percent actually felt 
close to a political party. Such results are interesting and favorable for greater rootedness. 
It is important however to consider that such closeness does not translate to partisanship. 
As seen in Graph 5, the results highlight a clear limitation of assuming that an increase in 
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perception of closeness to a political party, could represent actually being partisan of this 
party. Graph 5 shows that only 5 percent of the respondents that felt close to a party, 
claimed to be partisan of this political party.  
Overall, party support during the 1980s, party identification from 2006 to 2010 
and, party closeness in 2011, reveal that the Peruvian electorate did not support, felt  
identified with or close to political parties during these years. This trend might not be 
increasing, but approximately 65 percent, do not feel any sense of strong linkage with the 
existing political parties. Such results, especially during the 1980s and with increasing 
support (approximately 75 percent) for an independent option up to 2010, show that in 
twenty of the thirty years examined, a significant percentage of the Peruvian electorate 
does not have any sense of linkage with political parties.  
 
Programmatic or Ideological Voting  
 
Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) found a high correlation between electoral 
volatility and ideological linkages. A high correlation between these phenomena allows 
them to claim that in countries where electoral volatility is low, empirical observation of 
ideological voting, in terms of ideological positioning, has higher probability. As expected, 
the contrary, i.e., high volatility figures, make it more difficult to predict an ideological 
vote. In order to measure a vote based on indicated ideological positioning, these authors 
measured the probability of the electorate “voting for a different party than before” and 
“shifting their position on the ideological left-right scale” (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006).  
This measurement focused on the three largest parties, determined by surveys, of party 
support in 33 countries. In Peru, the Peruvian political parties identified as the largest 
were APRA, Union Por el Cambio (UPP) and Cambio 90.   
The results from measuring the correlation between the electorate’s shift in party 
preference and the change in their self-positioning in Peru, was measured at 0.06. This 
figure indicates that party preference is not related to “self-placement”. When compared 
to the correlation findings in other countries, Peru’s results are remarkable. Peru ranks in 
the 31st out of 33 positions, and is the lowest ranking country in Latin America. It can be 
argued thus, that Peru’s ideological voting score showed no party roots in society during 
the 1990s. 
Melendez (2011) argues that other indicators can show a renewal, of ideological 
voting in 2011 in Peru5. Data surveys by IOP-PUCP6 from May 2011 shows that Peruvians 
                                                 
5 Surveys focused on identifying a candidate in a left-right scale (0-10), positioned Javier Perez de 
Cuellar, a left wing candidate with UPP, at 6.9, and Fujimori at 7 in 1995.  
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seem to be able to identify presidential candidates based on ideological considerations 
(Melendez, 2011, p.12). In fact, the mean average results show the following left to right 
identification: Ollanta Humala (3.4), Alejandro Toledo (6.1), Luis Castañeda (6.5), Keiko 
Fujimori (6.7) and Petro Kuczynsky (7.2). Such results are somewhat concordant with the 
actual ideological positioning of these candidates. Moreover, due to the fact that the 2011 
elections had a second round, the electorate was able to notice “programmatic 
moderations” in both candidates. Humala was positioned at 4 from 3.4, and Keiko 
Fujimori, daughter of Alberto Fujimori, at 6.3 from 6.7 (Ibid). These results can be 
considered to actually reflect electoral ideological understanding and ability to position a 
candidate along a left-right scale in 2011.  
 
The data presented thus far permits the making of some important inferences 
regarding party rootedness in Peru. Firstly, the probability of voting based on 
programmatic or ideology considerations during the 1990s is remarkably low. This result 
characterizes the inability of Peruvian parties to have strong roots. However, the ability of 
Peruvians to position candidates in a left-right scale in 2011, supposes that ideology could 
be linked to a programmatic vote in the 2011 elections (Melendez, 2011). Such results, 
though positive for an ideological linkage to be considered, should be carefully observed.  
Despite being able to identify political leaders in an ideological scale, this does not 
translate into voting being actually based on ideological or programmatic considerations. 
Therefore, observation of this indicator’s development should follow in the coming 2016 
general elections in order to actually be able to make the argument that programmatic  
voting may influence the electorate’s vote. It may be too soon to regard these figures as a 
renewal of an ideological vote because 62 percent in the 2011 closeness survey identified 
no linkage with the existing political parties.  
The regression run by Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) shows evidence of almost a 
non-existent ideological or programmatic voting taking place during the 1990s and early 
2000s in Peru. This result characterizes the lack of the prominent Peruvian parties’ to 
have strong roots during these years. Overall, during thirty years of rootedness 
examination in Peru of a variety of indicators, show that during the 1990s up to 2010, a 
clear lack of strong party identification, support or even, sense of closeness in 2011, was 
present.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
6 IOP-PUC is a survey company from the Catholic University of Peru.  
45 
 
Number of Parties 
  
A consistent phenomenon that seems to transpire in the Peruvian party system is that of 
new parties emerging. Contrary to belief, an increasing number of parties does not entail 
better competition. In fact, a system is considered as fragmented if it is composed of many 
elected parties (Caulier, 2011, p.2). But for meaningful competition, there should be 
enough parties in the system. However it should not be so many that it becomes difficult to 
form governments and exercise decision-making (Cooppelge, 2011 in Diamond and 
Gunther (2001), p.235). Thus, a minimum of two parties is the requisite.  
The Peruvian party system, from 1980s has witnessed political parties either 
disappearing in less than a decade, or emerging one or two years before elections. In fact, 
during the general elections held in 2006, there were 22 parties competing for support. 
This figure is remarkably high, but evidently, only a smaller number of parties gather a 
significant vote share. Proper understanding of the party system is limited therefore if one 
only relies on the overall number of parties. In order to determine what the actual number 
of parties represents, specific indicators have been developed in the political science 
discipline.   
In order to measure the number of parties, this study firstly accounts for the total 
number of parties that have participated in the general elections from 1980 to 2011 in 
Peru. Subsequently, to determine the significance of these numbers, the Laakso-Taagepera 
index of Effective Number of Parties (ENP) is employed. ENP allows having a figure that 
represents the level of fragmentation in a party system. The level of fragmentation thus 
indicates the number of parties that obtain a significant proportion of the vote share or 
seats (Alcantara, 2004, p.32).  
 
 
Number of Parties 
 
The number of political parties in a context of elections, either nationally or locally, 
allows understanding of the structure of a partidist competition in greater detail 
(Alcantara, 2004, p32). Accordingly, the total number of political parties participating in 
the general elections in Peru since 1980 is provided in the following table. 
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Table 3. Number of Political Parties Participating in the General Elections, 1980-2011 
Election 
Year 
 
1980 
 
1985 
 
1990 
 
1995 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2006 
 
2011 
       
Number 
of 
Parties 
 
15 
 
9 
 
9 
 
14 
 
9 
 
8 
 
22 
 
11 
       
Source: Personal Elaboration based on data from ONPE.  
 
As seen in Table 3, the number of parties during the 1980 elections was very high. 
15 parties competed in the general elections in that year, after the military regime of the 
60s and 70s had ended. Not surprisingly, a return to democracy, as it has been reported in 
the literature, showed many political parties, or political movements, participating in the 
general elections of 1980. Between 1980 and 1985, the number of parties, decreases 
almost by half. During these years, as described previously, four political forces became 
prominent in the Peruvian political system (APRA, AP, PPC and IU). In 1995, the number of 
parties increased and 14 parties competed in elections this year, again quite a high figure 
compared to the two preceding elections. In the subsequent two elections however, the 
number of parties decreases to 9 and 8 respectively. It has to be noted that during the 10-
year period from 1990 until 2000, Fujimori’s regime, during his second term in office was 
considered authoritarian.  
Considering Fujimori’s term between 1990 and 2000 as authoritarian, one would 
expect to see, fewer political parties running for office due to political repression. 
Moreover, after Fujimori was elected7 president for the third time and renounced office 
the same year, an increase of the number of parties would be expected. However, in 2001, 
8 political parties ran for office, the lowest number since democratic elections took place 
in Peru after the 1980s. The unprecedented was thus expected in 2006, when no less than 
22 parties competed in the general elections. In the last general elections undertaken in 
Peru, that of 2011, the amount of parties, decreased by half to 11. Overall, a trend 
regarding the number of parties in Peru only, is difficult to support. However, the 
predominant change from one election to another, and remarkably in the last three 
general elections held, is rather evident.  
 
                                                 
7 As mentioned previously, Fujimori’s third election in 2000 was considered fraudulent and 
evidence of corruption became available for the population, making him renounce as president of 
Peru the same year.  
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Effective Number of Parties 
 
Having considered the precise number of parties during the last 8 general 
elections taking place in Peru, it is necessary to determine what has been defined as the 
actual ‘effective number of parties’, in order to make comprehensive inferences about the 
fragmentation of the Peruvian party system. This section employs the Effective Number of 
Parties developed by Laakso-Taagepera (1979). ENP8 ranges from 1.0 to infinity and 
“counts parties after weighting them by their share of the votes or seats, producing an 
"effective" number of parties that can be expressed in fractional terms” (Cooppelge, 2011 
in Diamond and Richard, 2011, p.222).  
The level of fragmentation determined by the ENP, has become the most 
commonly used and effective, indicator of party system fragmentation in political science. 
When scoring higher than 4, the system is to have high levels of fragmentation (Cooppelge, 
2011). The ENP of the Peruvian general elections since 1980 are presented based on 
Margarita’s Battle (2012) calculation of the ENP. The following graph provides the ENP for 
all presidential elections undertaken in Peru.  
 
Graph 6. Level of Fragmentation (ENP) in General Elections in Peru, 1980-2011 
Source: ONPE in Battle (2012). 
 
As Graph 6 depicts, the ENP for 1980 and 1985 scores 3,45 and 2,76 respectively, 
which, when considering the number of parties presented previously, accounts for more 
parties participating during the presidential elections in 1980 (15) and less in 1985 (9). 
Importantly, only 3 and 2 parties dominated the party system during this decade. 
Interestingly, as seen in Table 4, the number of parties during the 1990 election was 9 in 
                                                 
8 ENP is calculated based on the formula proposed and developed by Laakso-Taagepera (1979): 
NEP= 1/∑pi2, where pi is the proportion of votes or seats obtained by the party.  
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total, same as in 1985. However, when measuring the ENP this year, four parties are 
identified, showing an increase of two parties to the party system. As seen when 
measuring electoral volatility in the previous dimensions, a great vote share was attained 
by FREDEMO and Cambio 90 in the general elections taking place in 1990, which would 
explain the increase of NEP by 2 from 1985 to 1990.  
In 1995, though 15 parties participated in the elections held this year, only two 
parties gathered the greatest share of the vote. Moreover, in accordance with the 
literature, an ENP of 2 for in 1995 and 2000 can be explained by the authoritarian regime 
of Fujimori. Though increasing by one party between 2000 and 2001, it is possible to 
observe that by 2006, four parties shape the political system. Though the 2006 figure is 
determined with fractions and the actual result is 4,5, it is evident that the level of 
fragmentation during 2006 and 2011 (4,46) in Peru is high.  
 
Overall, as seen when examining the number of parties and determining the 
effective number of parties, the Peruvian party system can be regarded as fragmented. 
Firstly, there have been numerous political parties (8-22) participating in the general 
elections since the 1980s in Peru. Such figures do not per se determine if the party system 
is fragmented, but do serve to illustrate continuous and, as seen in the 2006 elections, 
critical trends. The importance of observing the number of parties lies in understanding 
that a high number of parties, especially in a presidentialist system, represents a 
combination that makes governability difficult (Mainwaring, 1993, 200).  
 Secondly, when assessing the number of parties by determining the Effective 
Number of Parties index to indicate the level of fragmentat ion, it is evident that in 1990, 
2006 and 2011, the Peruvian party system possessed high levels of fragmentation. But, it 
is also necessary to examine what high levels of fragmentation imply for the type of party 
system in Peru. Accordingly, the multi-party system in Peru, with the exception of 
Fujimori’s regime between 1995-2000, was classified as either moderate or polarized. 
Particularly significant is to observe that in 2006 and 2011, the party system is highly 
polarized and with high levels of fragmentation.  
Lastly, though it is important to acknowledge that different economic, social and 
political indicators determine the levels of fragmentation, the constant variation in the 
indicators examined in this section, shape a Peruvian party system that is vulnerable and 
in unstable. High levels of fragmentation do not only make the system less governable 
(Payne et al, 2003, p.155), they clearly allow for other forms of governability to emerge.  
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However, it is not an exaggeration to regard the Peruvian party system as critically 
vulnerable and inclined to fragmentation. Moreover, an unexpected tendency shows that 
from 2006 onwards, the Peruvian party system possesses high levels of fragmentation.  
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Chapter 6. The Quality of Democratic Representation 
 
The Quality of Democratic Representation is examined in this section based on 
three different indicators that, according to this study, hold important considerations for 
democratic representation. So far, indicators that examine Party System Fragmentation 
have been examined. Competition through electoral volatility, rootedness through 
programmatic or ideological voting and party identification, as well as levels of 
fragmentation by the (effective) number of parties, have collectively formed a clear and 
continuously fluctuating picture of the party system in Peru from 1980to 2011.  
Considering the information provided thusfar, it is important to establish how 
party system fragmentation, through the dimen1sions and indicators previously 
examined, may influence the quality of democratic representation in Peru. This section is 
thus concerned with determining the indicators that, according to this study, best 
comprise the quality of democratic representation. Furthermore, these indicators are 
considered as deeply interconnected with the dimensions examined as comprising a party 
system fragmentation.  
This study proposes that the quality of democratic representation is influenced by 
party system fragmentation. In order to examine this claim, it is important to determine 
the indicators that operationalize the quality of democratic representation. These are 
listed as follows:   
1.  Outsiders, 
2.  Trust in institutions, and 
3.  Clientelist linkages. 
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Outsiders  
 
Since the third wave of democratization Latin American democracies have seen the 
rise of political prominence of outsider candidates in presidential elections (Carrera, 2012, 
p. 1452). Democratic representation involves focusing specifically on the relationship 
between the voters and those in charge of representing them. The fact that, personalities 
or, outsiders, with no political background may actually win elections requires 
examination. The concept of political outsiders is thus, the first indicator examined in this 
section.  
Accordingly, the emergence of political outsiders, also called anti-system figures, is 
determined by identifying electoral candidates on the basis of their political experience 
and political discourse in Peru. As mentioned initially in this study, the definition given to 
outsiders in this study, builds on the categorization by Carreras (2012) and Baar (2009). 
Thus, an outsider is defined in this study as a political candidate who does not have prior 
political experience at the time of the electoral campaign, and who gains popular support 
not in association with a traditional political party (Carreras, 2012, p.1456; Baar, 2009, 
p.33). In fact, as Carrera claims, outsiders “arrive in power through a new party that is 
often nothing but an electoral vehicle” to win elections (Ibid, p.1453).  
In order to identify an outsider in the Peruvian political system, two conditions 
have to be met. Firstly, the candidate must not have political experience at the time he or 
she runs for office. And secondly, he or she must identify as an independent or as part of a 
new political party.  
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Peruvian Outsiders 
 
In Peru, based on the definition and conditions established to qualify as an 
outsider, four personalities can be labeled as such. The following table shows the list of 
Peruvian outsiders during the time frame of this study (1980-2011). 
 
Table 4. Peruvian Outsiders in Peru 
Source: Personal elaboration based on Carreras (2012).  
 
 In order to understand the emergence of these outsiders in Peru and their 
continuous presence is all presidential elections since 1990, a brief description of the 
electoral and social context shaping the candidacies of the identified outsiders is useful.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Ollanta Humala runs for office with UPP as an “invited candidate”.   
Election 
Year 
Outsider 
Political Party and Foundation Year 
Career and 
Political Experience 
 
1990 
 
Mario Vargas Llosa 
FREDEMO (1988) 
 
Novelist 
No experience 
 
 
1990 
 
Alberto Fujimori 
Cambio 90 (1989) 
 
 
Agricultural Engineer 
University lecturer/ Dean 
No experience 
 
 
2001 
 
 
Alejandro Toledo 
Peru Posible (1998) 
 
 
Economist 
No experience 
 
 
2006 
 
Ollanta Humala 
Unión Por el Perú (UPP) (1994)9 
 
 
Army Officer 
No experience 
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Mario Vargas Llosa and Alberto Fujimori 
 
In 1989, the political party Cambio 90 was formed and a year later, it achieved the 
impossible. It won the presidential elections with a candidate that was unknown to the 
Peruvian population only two years before. Alberto Fujimori, who had no background in 
politics or technocrats, gathered interest and sympathy in late 1989, and won the 
presidential elections with a 50 percent support for Cambio 90 in a second run-off against 
novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. Fujimori "was a former university professor with no ties to 
the traditional political system” (Fair, 2010, p.88). His background allowed him to hold a 
discourse based on the criticism of the current political system (Ibid). Moreover, Fujimori 
managed to gather rapid electoral support because he identified himself  with the poorer 
social sectors, which proved to be successful.  
The 1990 elections did not only show that the emergence of outsiders was 
occurring, but also that the traditional political forces of the 1980s were undergoing a 
crisis of support. As seen when measuring the electoral volatility, APRA and IU only 
gathered 26.2 percent in the first round of elections, 19.2 percent and 7 percent of vote 
support respectively. Characterized by a run-off system that consisted of going to a second 
round if not more than 50 percent of the vote was gained in the first round elections, both 
Cambio 90 and FREDEMO passed to the second round.  
FREDEMO, a coalition formed in 1989 and represented by Mario Vargas Llosa, 
obtained no less than 32 percent in the 1990 election. Vargas Llosa, who appeared 
primarily as a leading innovator needed by the country, would soon appear before the 
public as the leader of neoliberalism just watching for the interests of economic elites 
(Fair, 2010, p.89). Thus, the electoral ‘contest’ was understood "as a choice between the 
rich and the poor or between whites and cholos (mestizos), in which “Vargas Llosa,  a critic 
of indigenous irrationality, was placed as the representative and embodiment of the 
interests of the rich, white and upper classes in general" (Ibid). Perhaps this was the 
polarized scenario that influenced the Peruvian electorate to choose Fujimori, or perhaps 
it was his “anti-system” rhetoric blaming the establishment, which resulted in his election. 
Electing Fujimori as president of Peru in 1990, initiated, an anti-party campaign (Tuesta, 
1995) during this decade that would shape future electoral elections in Peru.  
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Alejandro Toledo  
 
Toledo, an economist with an Andean and Indian ethnic ancestry, “brushed past 
more experienced rivals in 2001” claimed Steven Levisky in an interview to a Peruvian 
television channel in 2003. In fact, Toledo’s main contender was Alan Garcia, leader of 
APRA, who had been president in 1985. The role of Toledo’s ethnic roots in helping him 
gain a presidential seat has been of much debate in the literature10. The decay of 
Fujimori’s regime and his exit in 2000 after been ‘fraudulently elected’, was perhaps also  a 
significant factor in Toledo’s campaign.  In fact, Toledo appeared in 2000 leading a massive 
social mobilization called “los cuatro suyos”11 against Fujimori’s regime. Toledo, together 
with other political forces, shamed Fujimori’s third consecutive election, calling it 
unconstitutional. Toledo gained popular support and in 2001, with no political experience 
and with no association to a traditional party, he became the president of Peru by 
gathering 40 percent of vote share in the first round and winning the second round with a 
total of 53 percent of electoral support.  
 
Ollanta Humala  
 
Ollanta Humala, a military officer with no political experience, is the last outsider 
identified in Peruvian politics. The elections of 2006, regarded as a highly polarized 
electoral campaign between Alan Garcia (APRA), who had lost against Alejandro Toledo in 
2001, and Ollanta Humala, shaped the electoral arena. Humala was regarded as a 
“candidate by default” in 2006 according to Carlos Melendez (2006), since he “was not a 
leader who mobilized the population” and was without the charisma or political 
approaches (2006, p.15) that a leader should possess. Humala lost in a second round 
against Alan Garcia. However, although practically unknown in Peru until 2004, Humala 
managed to gather 30 percent of electoral support in the first round of the 2006 general 
elections. And in 2011 Ollanta Humala won the presidential elections in Peru.  
 
The emergence of political outsiders is an important phenomenon in Peru, not only 
because these personalities appear suddenly and can quickly gather popular support, but 
because they actually can win elections. Several explanations can help understanding the 
emergence of outsiders. As outlined previously, there are underlying factors that play an 
                                                 
10 See: Madrid (2005): The Rise of Ethnic Voting in Latin America.  
11 Which translates as “all the regions” from Quechua, the second official language in Peru.  
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important role in shaping the political system in a country. The socio-economic context 
argues Benton (2005) influences people to be more inclined to vote for an outsider. When 
the country experiences economic hardship and the traditional parties are in power, these 
parties are blamed and the electorate is more likely to vote for small parties or outsider 
candidates to punish all the established political parties” (Benton, 2005 in Carreras, 2012, 
p.1641). Considering this, the economic crisis of the 1980s may help in explaining the 
election of Fujimori in 1990. However, such economic memory would be limited in 
explaining the presidential election of Alejandro Toledo in 2001 and the support for 
Ollanta Humala in 2006, since Peru’s economy has been considered stable during the 
decade 2000 -2010. 
The emergence of outsiders is also an important factor that can help examine the 
relationship between the voters and those who represent them, thus being relevant for 
democratic representation. The emergence of four Peruvian outsiders since 1990 and 
therefore in the last six elections, is a clear indication that the electorate does not feel 
represented by the existing system. The functions that political parties should perform, 
specifically those concerned with accountability and responsiveness, do not seem to be 
present in the party system in Peru. According to this study, the rise of prominent 
outsiders shaping the political system in Peru is a clear indicator that political parties are 
not fulfilling their role as agents of representation. The personalities identified as 
outsiders in this study, competed in elections and/or won elections, through newly 
formed parties. These new parties are identified by the literature as mere “electoral 
vehicles” (Carreras, 2012, p.1453) used by these candidates only to win elections.  
It is doubtful if the election of these candidates would have occurred in a stable 
and strong party system. Undoubtedly, these outsiders would not have had the 
opportunity to quickly gather support and be elected if the Peruvian electorates felt 
represented by the existing parties and possessed strong partisan identification. 
In fact, when examining the 2006 electoral campaign, Carlos Melendez (2006) 
described the vote for Humala as representing the people that rejected the political 
establishment (Melendez, 2006, p.15). The fragmentation that characterizes the current 
Peruvian party system is regarded as a significant explanation for the emergence of 
outsiders in Peru since 1990 onwards.  
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Trust in Institutions 
 
Besides the emergence of outsiders being considered an important indicator to 
examine the quality of democratic representation, the relationship between the principals 
and agents must also be examined to determine the level of actual trust towards political 
institutions, which the electorate possesses. Thus, trust is a proxy to measure if citizens 
feel well represented (Mainwaring et al, 2006, p.17). Trust in institutions is measured on 
the basis of how the Peruvian electorate views the political party, whether it is considered 
legitimate, represents their interests and is therefore, trustworthy. This section briefly 
examines the results from the surveys carried out by the Latinobarometro between 1995 
and 2011. Before 1995, data are unfortunately not available for this indicator. However, 
16 years should allow the determination of a general trend addressing the feeling of 
representation of the Peruvian electorate.  
Graph 7 makes it possible to distinguish the trend held by the Peruvian electorate 
when questioned if they trusted political parties. The options provided to answer were: 
“Great, considerable, minimal-none and does not know or no response”. For the purpose of 
analysis, the last options, “does not know or no response”, is not included in the following 
graphs as it does not have much significance in the surveys.  
 
Graph7. Trust in Political Parties in Peru, 1995-2011 
Source: Personal elaboration based on Latinobarometro Survey, 1995-2011. 
 
Graph 7, shows that approximately 75 percent of the Peruvian population has 
minimal to no trust in political parties between1995 and 2011. Accordingly, great trust in 
parties is not only extremely low, but decline between 1995 and 2006, by which time it 
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reaches a striking low of 0.2 percent. Great trust in political parties is thus minimal since 
1995 and continues a somewhat steady trend that implies the electorate feeling little 
representation by the political parties. .  
When observing the considerable trust option, there is a consistent considerable 
trend of no less than 17 percent between 1995 and 2006. Compared to great trust, these 
figures can be regarded as somewhat favorable. Even though Peruvians may not trust 
political parties greatly, at least between 17 and 21 percent from 1995 and 2006, have had 
some degree of trust. 2001, the year when Alejandro Toledo is elected and only a year 
after Fujimori’s regime had ended accounted for the higher considerable trust in political 
parties, at 21 percent. These results show however, that 2011 is the year in which 
considerable trust is lowest with a percentage of 14,3.  
 Since between 1995 and 2011, an average of 77,6 percent of the population in 
Peru, claims to trust political parties minimally or not at all, it can be argued that a great 
majority of Peruvians do not feel represented by political parties. In 2011, minimal to no 
trust reaches the highest percentage since 1995, at almost 83 percent. Such high results 
signify that an increasing amount of the population feels unrepresented. Moreover, 
extreme low levels of trust imply dissatisfaction with the political parties, which is one of 
the main, existing mechanisms of representation.  
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Clientelist Linkages  
 
According to this study, examining the nature of the diverging linkage patterns in 
Peru, assesses a central aspect of the quality of democratic representation. As sustained 
initially, the literature identifies three linkage mechanisms between the voter and the 
representative: ideological or programmatic, clientelist and personalist (Kitchelt, 2000, 
p.847). A clientelist linkage is defined in this study as having the nature of a direct 
exchange of goods and “material advantages” (Ibid, 853). Due to the fact that is it difficult 
to determine if a vote translates as ideological, clientelar or personalist (Melendez, 2012, 
p.12), or a mix of these, much of the literature has been only concerned with determining 
the significance of the ideological or programmatic vote. Furthermore, unfortunately, “the 
analysis of the extent of clientelism is handicapped by the lack of valid cross-national 
empirical measures of this concept”(Kitschelt, 2000 in Jhones, 2005, p.44).  
Accordingly, the author sustains that although the concept of clientelism has no 
conceptual relation with political corruption, an empirical relationship (200, p.853) exists 
and can be determined. Corruption involves “the use of private office for private ends, 
whether personal or promoting one’s political party” (Heywood, 1997; Hutchcraft, 1997 in 
Kitschelt 2000, p. 853).  
Clientelism, though difficult to measure empirically, is thus measured by 
employing corruption as a proxy measure, as recommended by Kitschelt (2000). As such, 
clientelist linkages are established by the perception of corruption in the Peru.  
 
The following graph shows the results for identifying the main problems in Peru. 
Graph. 8. Identified Main Problems in Peru, 2002-2010 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the National Survey on Perception VI Comparison in 
Peru. SUPPORT-Transparency International 2010.   
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In Graph 8, the Peruvian population believes corruption is one of the main 
problems in the country, along with poverty and unemployment. Though the perception of 
corruption is not as high as poverty or unemployment, the results show that there is a 
tendency increasing since 2003. In fact, 2010 is the year that corruption, scores the 
highest, at 51 percent.  
Graph 9 shows the results of the perception of corruption in Peru. The majority of 
the population actually considers the country as corruption or very corrupt. Moreover, 
though considerably high 2004, the “very corrupt” option, shows decrease up to a much 
lower 28 percent by 2010.  
 
Graph 9. Perception of Corruption in Peru, 2004-2010 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the National Survey on Perception VI Comparison  
in Peru. SUPPORT-Transparency International 2010.  
 
Graph 10 shows that when asked which institution is most  corrupt, Peruvians identify 
political parties as the second most corrupt, after the congress.  
Graph 10. Peruvian public institutions conceived as corrupt in Peru, 2010. 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the National Survey on Perception VI Comparison in 
Peru. SUPPORT-Transparency International 2010. 
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Graph 9 shows that when compared to other institutions, Peruvians identify 
political parties as prominently corrupt. In fact, around a 52 percept of Peruvians think 
political parties are corrupt. Though it is difficult to determine the extent to which 
corruption explains clientelist linkages conceptually, it is possible to acknowledge that 
Peruvians tend to agree largely with a perception of corruption in Peru overall. Thus, since 
corruption has been employed as a proxy to determine clientelism, it can be argued that 
clientelist linkages take place in Peru. Moreover, people are able to identify and give their 
opinion about these linkages.  
Lastly, corruption in the country should not necessarily be read as competing 
against programmatic or personalist linkages. This finding illustrates that corruption is 
present in Peru and that people identify political parties as corrupt. Thus, establishing that 
the mechanisms that are supposed to represent and account for the people’s interests are 
seen as medium in which material exchange of goods take place thus making them highly 
corrupt.  
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Chapter 7. Implications  
  
This study has examined party system fragmentation and democratic representation in 
Peru between 1990 and 2011. Considering the outcomes this study has produced, several 
inferences can be delivered.  
Party System Fragmentation in Peru within the time frame of this study, shows 
significant values. As such, relatively high levels of electoral volatility characterize 
competition between 1980 and 2011. In the 2011 general elections, volatility scored a 
grand 100 percent, confirming that competition in the country is in constant variation. 
Though it is not possible to identify an overall trend, the results illustrate a predominantly  
shift in vote support, thus an unstable competition.  
Regarding rootedness, interestingly since the 1980s, it possible to see significant 
numbers of people who identify as “independents” in a list composed by other parties. 
This suggests how disenchantment with the established political parties started partaking 
in the country. Party affiliation shows significant results in the years after.  
Even though the concepts of identification, support, or closeness to political parties 
are different to each other, these have been employed in the current to determine 
rootedness. In fact, perhaps is actually beneficial to measure identification along different 
lines. If a voter has the possibility to associate her understanding of a concept to her 
feelings towards political parties, maybe results will show different attitudes towards 
parties. Unfortunately however, these three concepts have all been met with a high 
percentage of voters (70), who do not associate in any manner with political parties. Only 
in 2011 it is possible to observe that more than 30 percent feels close to a political party. If 
compared to those who do not (60 percent) however, such results are not that significant. 
Overall thus, the Peruvian party system is shaped extremely weak rootedness, as the 
majority of Peruvians do not possess a sense of party identification.   
 
When examining the number of parties and the Effective Number of Parties (ENP), 
numerous parties have run for office. The literature identifies that increasing amounts of 
parties make governability more difficult and fragmentation more likely. For example, a 
new party might obtain more vote support than expected, such as Cambio 90 in 1990, 
which resulted in destabilizing the vote shared by other traditional parties.  As such, new 
parties may in fact influence vote shift. Such consideration permits to regard the 
electorate as very malleable in Peru. Lastly, considering the ENP, there is no evidence to 
suggest a trend of high levels of fragmentation overall. However, ENP figures are higher 
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than 4 in 2006 and 2011, which establishes the Peruvian party system as fragmented 
based on this indicator12.  
Based on the previous examination, the Peruvian party system is one 
characterized by constant variation and instability. Furthermore, regarding the results for 
the most recent years, the party system in Peru seems to resemble that of the 1980s and 
early 1990s, when it was first identified as fragmented.  
 
As argued initially, this study is concerned with the linkage mechanisms contained 
in a principal-agent relationship, thus also within the party system, since political parties 
are considered as prime mechanisms of representation. Particularly focusing in the 
linkages established in the Peruvian party system thus, it is important to determine how 
these vary in a party system that is inclined to fragmentation and characterized by 
instability. In such context, and considering that democratic governance is “about 
“establishing linkages of accountability and responsiveness between the voter and her 
representative” (Diamond and Gunther, 2001, p.300), this study identifies that the party 
system fragmentation in Peru has serious consequences for democratic representation. 
Specifically along the dimensions established as representing the quality of democratic 
representation, a fragmented party system will deteriorate or even diminish, the existing 
representation linkages. As such, when the voter shifts her vote from one election to the 
next, when she does not identify with a party and when she observes increasing number of 
parties and new parties gaining electoral support, the linkages of accountability and 
responsiveness are weak or non existent.  
 
It can be argued therefore, as seen in Peru, that the voter will rely on other forms 
of linkages and will seek other mechanisms of representation in order to establish a 
principal-representative relationship. By measuring the indicators of democratic 
representation identified as accounting for its quality, it is possible to determine 
important implications about these linkages in Peru.  
 
Firstly, the emergence of outsiders can be highly influenced by voters who do not 
identified with, feel close to, or support the existing political parties. In addition, is not 
only the electorate that may be disenchanted with existing representation mechanisms, 
i.e., the political parties, but also the rising political outsider. As seen previously, Fujimori 
and Ollanta most remarkably, characterized themselves as anti-establishment figures. In 
                                                 
12 In order to further analyze what the ENP represents. Chasquetti (2000), develops an interesting 
conceptualization of ENP figures to determine the type of party system. See Appendix.    
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fact, in a context of party system instability and fragmentation, when the existing 
mechanisms of representation fail to represent the interest of the principals, is not 
unexpected that an outsider like Fujimori gathered popular support and won elections in 
1990.  
Secondly, when linkages of representation are barely ‘representative’, weakened 
by fragmentation, the principal will seek to establish other forms of linkages, such as those 
that rely with clientelist characteristics. In order to evaluate clientelist linkages in Peru, 
corruption is used as a proxy. The Peruvian case shows significant evidence. On the one 
hand, political parties are regarded as highly corrupt, and on the other, Peruvians 
identifies the country as highly corrupt. In line with this study’s arguments, corruption 
perception in Peru makes possible to identify the clear disenchantment with political 
parties and the identification of clientelist linkages.  
Moreover, high distrust in political parties further strengthens the evidence of  
linkages deteriorating in a fragmented party system. Low levels of trust in Peru, illustrate 
increasing dissatisfaction with the representation mechanisms, and in fact, also represent 
that Peruvians do not believe they are well represented.  
 
Thus far, based on the clear influence party system fragmentation presupposes for 
the quality of democratic representation, this study rejects the N0 hypothesis. Moreover, 
the current study finds evidence that in Peru, when the electorate shows that 
representation linkages are weakened, manifested in a fragmented party system, other 
mechanisms of representation are developed. These new forms or varying linkages are 
established either when supporting an outsider or perceiving an exchange of goods for 
support. Therefore, when the electorate seeks other representation mechanisms, this has 
significant consequences for the quality of democratic representation.   
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Chapter 8. Conclusions 
In order to examine the relationship between party system fragmentation and 
democratic representation, the latter has been operationalized along three indicators this 
study regards as representing its quality. Moreover, the current shows that if the 
dimensions measured in order to determine the quality of democratic representation are 
salient, it is possible to acknowledge that a crisis of representation occurs. In addition, 
since party system fragmentation affects the quality of democratic representation, this 
phenomenon is to be found as contributing to such crisis. The Peruvian case shows clear 
signs that a crisis of democratic representation is visible. Moreover, these signs are greatly 
influenced, as seen, by the indicators of party system fragmentation in Peru.  
Therefore, the findings in this study make possible to agree with the literature and 
confirm that high levels of fragmentation do not only make the system less governable, 
“also represent a democratic rupture and an institutional crisis” (Payne et al, 2003, p.155; 
Linz in Alcantara, 1994, p.32). Such conclusion calls into question the role and importance 
of political parties to democratic stability and governance. It is evident that if political 
outsiders emergence, there is a continuous distrust to political parties and corruption is 
perceived, these collectively can influence the reconstruction and stability of the party 
system. Such consideration thus, establishes the importance of conceptualizing these 
phenomena together as they influence each other considerably.   
Furthermore, considering that political parties occupy a central role in the 
literature due to the functions they perform, the Peruvian electorate seems to challenge 
their importance. In fact, it is possible to observe high levels of rejection to the established 
parties, manifested in most of the indicators measured thus far. Paradoxically, when asked 
if a democracy can exist without parties, Peruvians, who portray signs of increasing 
disenchantment with parties and the system, manifest that democracy cannot exist 
without parties. Such reality thus, shapes the Peruvian puzzling politics.  
Understanding why the Peruvian population seeks for different linkage 
mechanisms of representation and believe the established system is failing them, as seen 
in the election of outsiders and increasing distrust, is significant for subsequent analysis.  
The Peruvian case helps building understanding and thus, making inferences, 
about concepts that the literature identifies as significant. Yet, as seen, recurring 
indicators that actually shape a crisis of representation comprise democratic 
representation in Peru. For a proper and multi dimensional understanding of the Peruvian 
puzzling political system however, a more extensive study is required. This study hopes to 
be helpful in showing how the relationship between the party system and democratic 
representation unfolded in Peru between 1980 and 2011.  
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Appendix 
 
Party System Classification and ENP 
With the intention to analyze the ENP further and examine what the level of 
fragmentation may represent, Chasquetti (2000) conceptualization of party system type is 
highly relevant for the current.  
Based on Sartori’s party system categorization (1980), Chasquetti (2000) attempts 
to adjust these system types according to the level of fragmentation determined by the 
NEP, as seen in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Party System Classification by Chasquetti (2000) 
Party Systems ENP 
Predominant Party 
 
Bipartidist 
 
Multi-Party (Moderate) 
 
Multi-Party (Polarized) 
ENP < 1,7 
 
1,8 > ENP < 2,4 
 
2,5> ENP < 3,9 
 
ENP > 4,0 
Source: Chasquetti (2000). 
 
Considering Chasquetti’s conceptualization, as seen in Table 4, Peru’s party system 
can be positioned in the last three categories from 1980 onwards. Although regarded as a 
bipartidist or two-party system during the two governments post-transition13, (Alcantara, 
2004, p.34), the Peruvian party system scoring approximately 3 for the 1980s, should 
actually be positioned in the categories of a Multi-Party, or moderate system. A moderate 
multi-party system is characterized by having low ideological polarization and is 
comprised of less than four relevant parties (Chasquetti, 200, p.33).  
In 1990, as seen in Graph*, then ENP is 4, which would categorize the party system 
as a polarized multi-party system. This type of multi-party system, explains Chasquetti, is 
characterized by high polarization and comprises more than 4 parties. Although the 
number of parties was not higher than 4 in 1990, it is possible to explain the polarization 
experienced when Fujimori and Vargas Llosa ran for office with opposing ideologies and 
representing two new political parties. In 1995 and 2000, with ENPs of 2,6 and 2,4 
respectively, the Peruvian party system would be categorized as a bi-party or two-party 
system, in line with Fujimori’s regime. By 2001, the ENP is 3, which would categorize the 
                                                 
13 Making reference to Velasco’s military dictatorship between the 60s and late 70s.   
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party system as a moderate multi-party system and thus, explain the end of Fujimori’s 
regime and a transition from a two-party system, to a multi-party system characterized by 
low ideological polarization. Between 2006 and 2011 however, the ENP results are higher 
than 4, which would thus, still categorize the party system as a multi-party system, but 
now as polarized.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
References 
 
Alcantara, Manuel and Freidenberg, Flavia. (2001) Los Partidos Políticos en América  
Latina. Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca.  
 
Alcantara, Manuel. (2004) Partidos Políticos en America Latina: Precisiones Conceptuales, 
Estado Actual y Retos Futuros. Fundació CIDOB. America Latina. No.3. pp. 33-36. 
 
Ascher, W. and Tarrow S. (1975) 'The Stability of Communist Electorates: Evidence from a 
Longitudinal Analysis of French and Italian Aggregate Data' , American Journal of Political 
Science, Vol.19 No.3 pp. 48o-i. 
 
Battle, Margarita. (2012) Sistemas de Partidos Multinivel en Contextos Unitarios en América 
Latina: Los Casos de Ecuador, Perú, Bolivia y Colombia (1978-2011). Doctorado en Procesos 
Póliticos Contemporáneos. Universidad de Salamanca.  
Barr, R. (2009). Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics. Party Politics, 15(1), 
pp.29-48. 
 
Beck, Ulrich. (1997) The Reinvention of Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press Brown, Mark B. 
(2006) Citizen Panels and the Concept of Representation. Journal of Political Philosophy.  
 
Burgees, Katrina and Levitsky, Steven (2003) Explaining Populist Party Adaption in Latin 
America. Environmental and Organizational Determinants of Party Change in Argentina, 
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Comparative Political Studies. Vol, 36 No. 8. Pp. 881-911  
 
Carreras, Miguel. (2012) The Rise of Outsiders in Latin America, 1980-2010: An 
Institutionalist Perspective. Comparative Political Science. Vol. 45, No.12. pp. 1451-1482. 
 
Castaneda, J. (1994) Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War. Vintage 
Books. 
Caulier, Jean-Francois (2011). The Interpretation of the Laakso-Taagepera Effective 
Number of Parties”, (2011). Documents de Travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne. 
Maison des Sciences Économiques. 
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